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| 1 |
ID:
112126
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the demand for criminal accountability for the atrocities committed after Kenya's contested December 2007 elections. It explains why, despite strong popular desire for accountability through prosecutions and the threat of and actual International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement, the government has failed to take concrete steps to try those believed primarily responsible. The article argues that the fundamental reason why the government has not initiated systematic prosecutions in regular domestic courts - or created, as promised, a hybrid national/international tribunal - is that those in charge of establishing these processes are, in many cases, those whom it would prosecute or their close allies. A hybrid tribunal now seems unlikely and credible national trials are an improbable alternative, though there are some reasons to be more optimistic following the new constitution of 2010. For the time being only international justice, which is beyond the government's reach, can achieve a breakthrough in criminal accountability, albeit in a very limited way.
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| 2 |
ID:
184653
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This article investigates the stark variation in elite appraisals of the performance of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Based on an online survey of diplomats posted to the UN headquarters, this article determines which country situations under ICC scrutiny respondents regard as successes or failures and, in turn, what parameters underpin their views. It also asks about negative cases; that is, country situations that never made it to The Hague due to political considerations. This article makes a two-fold contribution to the study of international law and politics. First, it shows that diplomats conceptualize international justice in terms of ongoing prosecutions and convictions obtained. Thus, they downplay indirect effects such as positive complementarity. Interestingly, scholars and diplomats agree on the court’s fiascos, yet dissent on successes. Finally, diplomats have proved tired of political considerations obstructing international justice. Survey data reveals that they want the court to investigate situations involving major powers.
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| 3 |
ID:
108034
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While there have been recent advances in theories of transitional justice, there remains a lack of theory about how truth commissions and human rights trials interact with each other to facilitate or constrain efforts at transitional justice. This is an important deficiency to remedy because numerous countries long ago leapt ahead of transitional justice theory by sequencing trials and truth commissions, while the International Criminal Court (ICC) will have to manage relationships with truth commissions as its work accelerates. The aim of this article is to use current literatures on transitional justice and political transitions to build a theory of how trials and truth commissions interact with each other. This will be done in three steps. First, the article will elaborate the goals and critiques of trials and truth commissions in order to provide a foundation for how they might interact. Second, the article will consider these institutions in sequence to understand how they interact when trials operate first, truth commissions first, or when they operate simultaneously. Third, the article will consider these sequences in context to understand how legacies of violence and its termination may affect their relationship. This effort is meant to clarify the theoretical issues at stake in the sequencing of these two important institutions, stimulate debate, and inform institutional design.
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| 4 |
ID:
190296
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If the International Criminal Court (ICC) manages to prosecute Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s former president, for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide it will be because the new Sudanese regime arrested and extradited him. African parties to the ICC, who had a legal duty to detain al-Bashir, avoided or refused this dramatic step and instead made a regional commitment to shield him. This article analyses the question of non-cooperation in relation to the most basic challenge facing African governments: their survival. Drawing on the notion of the ‘gatekeeper state’, it theorises three sources of regime security, which variously converge and conflict: border control, domestic alliances and international support. Cooperation with the ICC may yield international support, while contradicting or undermining border control and domestic alliances. A case study of Chad’s non-cooperation illustrates the framework and the dynamic interplay of the sources of regime security that cause shifts between cooperation and non-cooperation in African gatekeeper states. More generally, the article demonstrates the merits of analysing African non-cooperation in the context of a dynamic politics of regime survival.
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| 5 |
ID:
159179
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This article aims to understand the policies of three major Northeast Asian states toward the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC) that it established. Using a unique measurement tool, it traces the interactions of South Korea, Japan, and China with the Court since negotiations on its formation in the late 1990s. Included in this analysis is a focus on how Northeast Asian states have responded to recent efforts to bring North Korea into the Court's orbit for that country's military actions in 2010 and its human rights record over several decades. Data is based on publicly available documents as well as interviews with diplomats, legislators, legal experts, and activists in Japan, South Korea, and China conducted in 2015.
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| 6 |
ID:
190839
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In states emerging from mass violence and human rights abuses, do individuals prefer retributive punishment of perpetrators through trials, or do they wish to be compensated with land or monetary reparations for their injuries? How does the concrete option of prosecutions by the International Criminal Court (ICC) moderate these preferences? Using unique survey data from 507 Kenyans collected in 2015, we build on and add nuance to the empirical literature that interrogates the link between exposure to mass violence and post-conflict justice preferences. We find that while some individuals prefer reparative justice, victims and witnesses generally want perpetrators to be prosecuted. Even for those who are co-ethnics of government leaders – who allegedly instigated widespread killing, sexual assaults and displacements – direct exposure to those acts leads to greater desire for prosecutions. We further find that one’s personal experience with violence also leads one to reject domestic justice in favor of international justice: victims and witnesses who favored retributive justice are highly likely to believe that the ICC is the best option for prosecuting perpetrators.
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| 7 |
ID:
108247
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article outlines US dissatisfaction with the International Criminal Court (ICC), before assessing the strengths and weaknesses of US objections from the point of view of international law. It concludes that most of the concerns expressed by the United States are either overstated or legally flawed but that there is good reason to object to the abrogation, for the purposes of trial before the ICC, of the immunities conferred by international law on at least certain US personnel.
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