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| 1 |
ID:
126220
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This research follows the Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems, Recommendations from the Guidelines Working Group, published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention nearly a decade ago. Since then, models have been developed and complex systems have evolved with a breadth of disparate data to detect or forecast chemical, biological, and radiological events that have a significant impact on the One Health landscape. How the attributes identified in 2001 relate to the new range of event-based biosurveillance technologies is unclear. This article frames the continuum of event-based biosurveillance systems (that fuse media reports from the internet), models (ie, computational that forecast disease occurrence), and constructs (ie, descriptive analytical reports) through an operational lens (ie, aspects and attributes associated with operational considerations in the development, testing, and validation of the event-based biosurveillance methods and models and their use in an operational environment). A workshop was held in 2010 to scientifically identify, develop, and vet a set of attributes for event-based biosurveillance. Subject matter experts were invited from 7 federal government agencies and 6 different academic institutions pursuing research in biosurveillance event detection. We describe 8 attribute families for the characterization of event-based biosurveillance: event, readiness, operational aspects, geographic coverage, population coverage, input data, output, and cost. Ultimately, the analyses provide a framework from which the broad scope, complexity, and relevant issues germane to event-based biosurveillance useful in an operational environment can be characterized.
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| 2 |
ID:
108426
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, improved biosurveillance has become a bipartisan national security priority. As has been pointed out by the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee and others, building a national biosurveillance enterprise requires having strong biosurveillance systems at the state and local levels, and additional policies are needed to strengthen their biosurveillance capabilities. Because of the foundational role that state and local health departments play in biosurveillance, we sought to determine to what extent state and local health departments have the right capabilities in place to provide the information needed to detect and manage an epidemic or public health emergency-both for state and local outbreak management and for reporting to federal agencies during national public health crises. We also sought to identify those policies or actions that would improve state and local biosurveillance and make recommendations to federal policymakers who are interested in improving national biosurveillance capabilities.
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| 3 |
ID:
109873
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The International Health Regulations (2005) gave the World Health Organization a central role in collecting biosurveillance data and explicitly recognized the importance of human rights for the first time. Human rights and biosurveillance have a complicated relationship with one another though. Surveillance systems are necessary in order to arrest the spread of infectious disease outbreaks, but these same surveillance systems can be used in discriminatory ways. Is some sort of resolution or detente possible? This article investigates the role of the World Health Organization in implementing these potentially competing imperatives contained within the International Health Regulations (2005). To understand this relationship, it examines how the World Health Organization would implement the International Health Regulations in case of an international zombie outbreak.
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