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| 1 |
ID:
120303
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Two big ideas have shaped recent debate about military doctrine: the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Counterinsurgency (COIN). These 'network centric' and 'population centric' worldviews appear contradictory, but this is a false dichotomy. American forces have actively developed RMA concepts in COIN environments during recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the exemplar par excellence is innovation by US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in doctrine, technology, and organization for counterterrorism. Ironically, SOCOM's reimagining of the RMA managed to both improve the strengths and underscore the weaknesses of the American military's technological prowess.
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| 2 |
ID:
108571
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Notwithstanding the perennial body of literature covering the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) debate over the past two decades, the vast majority of writings
have been silent or ignored the implications of the RMA diffusion on the security
and defense policies of advanced small states and middle powers. This paper
bridges this knowledge gap by tracing the impact of the RMA diffusion and its
adaptation in the Republic of Korea's military modernization processes. The principal
argument is that for over two decades South Korea has been rethinking its
defense strategies, while searching for relevant operational concepts that would
allow greater flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy that address existing as well
as future-oriented defense requirements. In the process, the ROK military has
pursued RMA-oriented force modernization in order to acquire advanced military
capabilities to counter the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological
and interoperability gaps with U.S. forces, and eventually attain a self-reliant
defense posture. In this context, South Korea's RMA trajectory shows patterns of
speculation and experimentation in terms of concepts, doctrine, and technology;
however, with relatively incremental implementation in the use of force. Accordingly,
there has not been a distinct Korean RMA-oriented conceptual strategic innovation
toward a new theory of war; nor has the Korean RMA trajectory reflected a disruptive
paradigm shift in warfare.
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