|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
108563
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China has clearly emulated Russia's previous example of making loud claims and
increasing military patrols in the Arctic. China will likely become a major player
in Arctic trade routes and become a main destination for goods shipped through
the Northern Sea Route. It is likely that a significant part of future Russian oil
and gas production will ultimately be supplied to China. What are the strategic
implications of China's active involvement in Arctic politics? The Arctic "Great
Game" is often described as a new Cold War between the United States and Russia.
Regionally, the two main protagonists are Russia and Norway. This article makes a
different argument. The Arctic has recently become an issue on the Russo-Chinese,
and possibly Russo-Japanese security agenda. The first goal of this article is to
examine the Arctic policy and strategy of Russia, perhaps the most difficult nation
to understand in terms of Arctic security. The second goal of the article is to
explain how the Arctic has become an issue of concern in Russia's relationship
with China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
108572
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Certain developments are emerging in East Asia that could accentuate the divisions
among ASEAN members over East Asian regionalism. One is the trend toward
financial and trade cooperation between ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries
that will make it difficult for ASEAN to resist East Asian regionalism. Another is
the growing global economic importance of East Asia that can reduce ASEAN's
centrality in this regionalism. These divisions are most pronounced between
Malaysia and Indonesia. While Malaysia wants the regional grouping to be a
community, Indonesia sees it as basically functional in purpose. Malaysia, unlike
Indonesia, sees some economic, especially financial, benefit from the regional
grouping. China is not seen by Malaysia as a threat to the region and can best be
accommodated in Malaysia's preferred grouping, the ASEAN Plus Three, while
Indonesia favors the East Asia Summit where India can help balance China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
108573
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article traces the evolution of European Union-China relations in terms of
arms transfer, specifically from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
States sell arms for the reasons of security, political influence, and the pursuit of
wealth; however, the motives for the arms trade conducted between these European
countries and China are driven by political decisions that will increase European
non-military exports to China to improve general trade conditions for European
investors in China. The EU-China arms trade should be perceived as a gesture of
goodwill, because even though China has a massive army and implements extensive
military modernization, EU countries have decided against a large-scale arms
trade with China. The EU arms trade with China remains limited due to political
decisions based on the responsibility to their allies within the European Union
and in terms of NATO with the United States.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
108570
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
What has happened to North Korea-China relations since autumn 2009 is nothing
less than a renewal of the alliance. This is a sea change, brought about first of all
by the deterioration of Kim Jong Il's health and then by all the resulting turmoil
of his regime's instability and difficulties. Both sides' policy behavior toward the
other became a "new game," dictated by a sort of dire emergency, and placed them
in a tightly fixed structure reducing much of the scope for a strategy adjustment.
Pyongyang's new game has been characterized prominently by volatility or a
malfunctioning of the "rational" policymaking capacity of the ailing dictator.
Volatile desperation dominates behavior in the leadership succession, in military
affairs, the nuclear arms program, its posture toward the United States and ROK,
respectively, and in its relations with China. The new game can be defined as one
between a volatile DPRK and a relatively loyal ally with an anxious strategy that
is cornered in its relations with the ROK and the United States on the North
Korean issue. China's relationship with the DPRK is the most complicated of all,
and in a sense disabling. As to China-ROK cooperation on the North Korea issue,
the above factors unfortunately dim the prospects; however, there is still reason
for optimism if efforts continue to be made to find a resolution to the problem.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
108566
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since the Lee Myung-bak administration came to office, the deterioration of the
North-South Korea relationship and heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula
are the direct consequence and responsibility of North Korea and its provocations.
North Korea has chosen confrontation with the South, dictated by its own internal
interests, skewed perceptions and the desire to bully the South into concessions.
The Lee administration's stance toward North Korea is no different from that of its
predecessors in its basic principles and approach to unification as a progressive
integration and not unification through absorption. The difference in the approach
of the Lee administration to North Korea is a stronger emphasis on resolving the
20-year stalemate over the nuclear issue. Previous South Korean administrations
showed themselves willing to resume talks with Pyongyang soon after North
Korean pressure and chronic provocations. However, the Lee administration has
held fast to its position of reciprocity, as it did after the killing of a South Korean
tourist at the Mt. Kumgang resort, where it insisted on a promise that there would
be no recurrence of such an incident, before the tour program could resume. The
Lee administration has refused to reward the North's brinksmanship diplomacy,
knowing that to do this will only encourage Pyongyang's chronic provocations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
108571
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Notwithstanding the perennial body of literature covering the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) debate over the past two decades, the vast majority of writings
have been silent or ignored the implications of the RMA diffusion on the security
and defense policies of advanced small states and middle powers. This paper
bridges this knowledge gap by tracing the impact of the RMA diffusion and its
adaptation in the Republic of Korea's military modernization processes. The principal
argument is that for over two decades South Korea has been rethinking its
defense strategies, while searching for relevant operational concepts that would
allow greater flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy that address existing as well
as future-oriented defense requirements. In the process, the ROK military has
pursued RMA-oriented force modernization in order to acquire advanced military
capabilities to counter the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological
and interoperability gaps with U.S. forces, and eventually attain a self-reliant
defense posture. In this context, South Korea's RMA trajectory shows patterns of
speculation and experimentation in terms of concepts, doctrine, and technology;
however, with relatively incremental implementation in the use of force. Accordingly,
there has not been a distinct Korean RMA-oriented conceptual strategic innovation
toward a new theory of war; nor has the Korean RMA trajectory reflected a disruptive
paradigm shift in warfare.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
108568
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite constant fluctuations between tensions and detente on the Korean peninsula,
the crisis in 2010, including the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyong Island
shelling has proved to become the most dangerous in decades-without obvious
new reasons or new contradictions to justify it. After President Lee Myung Bak's
coming to power in South Korea, Pyongyang developed suspicions over his new
hard-line stance and demands for denuclearization. North Korea thought that
Seoul's call for reforms were merely a cover to undermine their regime and it
took seriously the desire by Southern conservatives for "early reunification" and
thus resorted to military provocations. Meanwhile, the U.S. Obama administration
chose to abstain from any meaningful policy toward North Korea, while China
played a more active role in supporting Pyongyang and Russian policy, which is
based on the priority of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. All issues
should be decided by political and diplomatic means without the use of force,
threats, pressure, or isolation. Improvements in North-South relations, DPRK
dialogue with the West, and a multilateral format are essential prerequisites for
realizing a new security system in Korea that takes into account the interests of all
parties. Only this can avert a new crisis. The author suggests a return to engagement
and the promotion of slow evolutionary changes in North Korea by giving the
current ruling elite tangible guarantees of security on the condition that the North
would change its domestic and international behavior.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
108574
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper uses KeyGraph, a chance discovery tool, to examine China's soft
power and identify potential and possible future research topics. The experimental
design examines 2,400 articles related to China's soft power. This examination
demonstrates that current soft power studies on China focus more on the aspects of
"promoting cultural development," "facilitating international influence," "safeguarding
core value concepts," and "developing soft power with Chinese characteristics."
Regarding the future evolution of soft power-related studies in China, this study
concludes that several aspects remain the most promising issues for future study:
cultural propaganda refinement, foreign policy adjustment, ideology entrenchment
measures in the form of ideological and political education to propagate government
policies and to strengthen civic control, and innovation of scientific development
concepts. The identification of these areas will contribute to the field of Chinese
soft power studies by serving as a valuable reference for future scholars. By
observing the development and tendencies of Chinese soft power studies within
the various stages of each topic's evolution, this paper extensively covers the
applicable aspects of the fields of culture, diplomacy, politics, and economics.
The conclusions derived from this study highlight the current status and possible
future course of development of soft power-related studies in China by concerned
domestic institutions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|