| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most dramatic developments in the field of armaments has been the rise of international collaboration over the last several decades. Nowhere has this phenomenon been more pronounced than the domain of military aircraft, where few states possess the resources to remain autonomous. Surprisingly, despite the theoretical advantages of interoperability and economies of scale, armaments collaboration has rarely, if ever, proven efficient. This article examines how states have employed governance structures, over time, to improve the collaborative process. To preview the conclusion, a stark trade-off exists between states' ability to control principal-agent dynamics and minimize collective action problems. Consequently, the dilemma of armaments collaboration is that any attempt to address principal-agent dynamics will aggravate collective action problems and vice-versa. With this in mind, it may be futile to continue reforming armaments collaboration because any governance structures will result in a deleterious combination of principal-agent dynamics and collective action problems.
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