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| 1 |
ID:
172090
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| 2 |
ID:
172381
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the US-led system of formal alliances remains the main pillar of the regional security architecture in Asia, alignment cooperation – centred on the Indo-Pacific maritime conceptualisation of the region – has been on the rise. This includes informal bilateral and minilateral agreements for security collaboration between regional and extra-regional US treaty allies or close security partners, notably Japan, Australia, India, the United Kingdom and France. While the various alignments complement and address the deficiencies of the formal US-led alliances, the functional and informal characteristics of alignments allow countries to pursue security cooperation both in conjunction with the United States and independently of it. This leads to a more fluid security architecture that increasingly reflects the diversity of emerging regional ‘architects’, among which Japan is assuming a leading role, as much as the region’s array of new security challenges.
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| 3 |
ID:
123006
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that the 'Indo-Pacific' has become an increasingly influential term during the last few years within Australian strategic debate. Consequently, the article looks at how the concept of the 'Indo-Pacific' as a region is impacting on Australia's strategic discussions about regional identity, regional role, and foreign policy practices. The term has a strategic logic for Australia in shaping its military strategy and strategic partnerships. Here, the article finds that Australian usage of the term operates as an accurate description of an evolving 'region' to conduct strategy within, but also operates quite frequently (though not inevitably or inherently) as a more contested basis for China-balancing. The article looks closely at four themes: the Indo-Pacific as a term, the rhetoric (strategic debate) in Australia surrounding the Indo-Pacific term, the Indo-Pacific policy formulations by Australia, and the developing Indo-Pacific nature of bilateral and trilateral linkages between Australia, India, and the United States.
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| 4 |
ID:
190663
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The Indo-Pacific region has become a central focus of great power competition. Not surprisingly, a rising China seeks to play an important, if not a leading role in the transformation of Asia’s present regional order. The United States, meanwhile, as the unipole, has strong incentives to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Facing certain structural and domestic constraints, China is disinclined to resort to the strategy of violent revision or subversion historically pursued by previous rising powers. Instead, China has pursued a gradual change of the existing regional order through a combination of internal balancing and external reassurance strategies. Specifically, China’s quest for great power status in the region, particularly in response to the Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the United States since the Trump administration, has prompted its proactive shift to counterbalance the US’ vision of order in the region. This paper argues that the balance of power and the balance of alignment constitute two key variables that affect the prospect of Sino-US competition for a preferable regional order. Beijing’s balancing strategies have significantly enhanced its economic and military capabilities, reducing the gap with the United States on the one hand and attracted certain regional states to join China-led regional initiatives on the other. However, owing to the complex balancing dynamics in the region and the agency of small and middle powers, the balance of alignment supports neither American nor Chinese dominance of Asia. Contrary to the ‘new Cold War’ narrative, the contest for order does not entail dividing the region into two rival blocs, but rather creating certain overlapping groupings and coalitions led by the two great powers. It consequently also signifies that the current order transition under a new bipolarity will be prolonged and relatively stable compared to the Cold War bipolarity.
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| 5 |
ID:
174959
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| 6 |
ID:
151124
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An idea and the reality encapsulating that idea have circular relation. Both follow each other and strengthen or weaken each other depending upon the level of congruence between the idea and reality. Though, survival of any new idea depends on this congruence, the idea has always a message and indicates a trend. The idea of ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a decade old, but it continues to evolve and strengthen as it represents a geo-strategic and geo-economic reality of our time. It replaced the notion of AtlanticPacific, which has been a dominant strategic framework with underlying political and economic significance for nearly half century after the end of cold war.
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| 7 |
ID:
121101
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2013.
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The rise and integration of the Indian Ocean region and the Pacific rim over the past decade - into an 'Indo-Pacific' zone - and the emerging competition between the region's major powers, has drawn increasing attention. However, France and the United Kingdom, while long established in the Indo-Pacific, are often overlooked, even though they are both themselves starting to refocus on the region. Paris has consolidated a 'quadrilateral' of interlocking military stations, which runs down the western Indian Ocean, while London has boosted its 'strategic array', a collection of military facilities, logistical hubs and regional partners and allies, stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to South-East Asia. Although fiscally under pressure, both countries seem determined to maintain their influence in the Indo-Pacific, but will nonetheless have their work cut out as emerging powers seek to boost their own respective positions in the region. Thus, the two European powers' ability to remain significant actors will depend on their willingness to coordinate with one another and other allies to focus their geopolitical awareness; create new partnerships with the rising Indo-Pacific countries; and provide the necessary resources to maintain - or better, bolster - their naval reach.
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| 8 |
ID:
138024
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| 9 |
ID:
127695
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| Publication |
New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd and NMF, 2014.
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| Description |
xix, 138p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789383649099
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057569 | 320.95401823/KAU 057569 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 057610 | 320.95401823/KAU 057610 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
192889
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite giving lip service to the importance of respecting the “centrality” of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy (CIPS) conflicts with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Instead, Canada defines its position in the Indo-Pacific through the lens of American priorities and perspectives. For its part, the AOIP expresses an ASEAN consensus position but fails to capture the highly complex and varied views of different ASEAN states toward the US and China. The ASEAN states are status-quo powers navigating a region that is undergoing profound strategic and economic changes. By allying itself so firmly with the US, Canada participates in sowing tension in the Indo-Pacific and may face potential consequences in the longer term. CIPS allows little room for the complex regional relations that the ASEAN states are trying to balance.
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| 11 |
ID:
138662
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This paper considers the concepts the Indo-Pacific as a strategic region and how it fits with Australis's evolving strategic perspectives.
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| 12 |
ID:
131829
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2014.
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The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.
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| 13 |
ID:
151134
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This paper explores the rise of a new geopolitical universe and proposes India to leverage its true potential in this emerging geo-strategic matrix through a comprehensive, integrated and carefully calibrated roadmap. The paper also discusses the emergence of the Indo-Pacific matrix from the Asia Pacific matrix, the capitalising of the transforming global image of India and an analysis of the various variables and developments in the global geopolitical multiverse that could have a direct impact on the Indo-Pacific matrix.
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| 14 |
ID:
109091
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| 15 |
ID:
164443
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| 16 |
ID:
172619
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| Publication |
Noida, HarperCollins Publishers, 2020.
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| Description |
xiv, 226p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789353579791
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Copies: C:1/I:1,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location | IssuedTo | DueOn |
| 059884 | 327.54/JAI 059884 | Main | Issued | General | | RA58 | 24-May-2024 |
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| 17 |
ID:
143836
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2016.
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| Description |
xxvii, 300p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788182748477
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058479 | 327.540468/KAU 058479 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
152899
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| 19 |
ID:
142811
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| 20 |
ID:
126380
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