Publication |
2013.
|
Summary/Abstract |
President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger took great pride in their success to achieve agreements on the limitation of Anti Ballistic Missiles and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Missiles with the Soviet Union. For Nixon, this agreement was not only an achievement that had been denied to his predecessor, it also seemingly represented the success of his own approach over that of his predecessors. Nixon-in tandem with Kissinger-intended to link arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to the resolution of other political problems such as Vietnam, the Mideast, and Berlin. Through the employment of linkage, they hoped to make U.S. arms control policy part of Détente. However, Nixon was able to sign the "historic agreements" because his policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because it was based on flawed assumptions and false premises. Thus, the historic success was possible precisely because Nixon had not actually made his arms control policy "distinct" from that of the Johnson Administration and its predecessors in his approach to strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union
|