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| 1 |
ID:
129795
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has done an admirable job of creating an "architecture of peace" to support the negotiations launched in July 2013. He engineered the appointment of retired U.S. General John Allen to delve deeply into Israel's security requirements following a peace treaty, recognizing that the security dilemmas would range far beyond the immediate challenges of securing an Israeli-Palestinian border. Kerry understood that Israel's readiness to take the risks associated with withdrawal from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) would be influenced directly by the degree to which Israel's security requirements were taken into account.
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| 2 |
ID:
123643
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
FIFTY YEARS ago, drawn to the perceived dynamism of fresh, young military leaders, scholars and policy analysts became enamored of the potential role of the military in political, economic and social modernization. The "man on horseback," as S. E. Finer described it, was seen as best positioned to effect the transition from developing to modern societies. The military, it was believed, could draw on the institutional cohesion and its monopoly of coercive power to marshal the resources and will necessary to push societies forward. Egypt was studied as a prime example.
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| 3 |
ID:
175750
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| Summary/Abstract |
From its inception, the Trump administration has had three objectives in relation to Israel and the Palestinians. The most important of these has been to “change the paradigm” of peacemaking. U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman indicated this in a February 11, 2020 presentation at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,1 and this has been a theme in many of the public pronouncements by Trump’s advisors. Their view, echoing that of the president, has been that all previous peace efforts have failed and that they know best how to make a good deal.
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| 4 |
ID:
109559
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AS THE end of 2011 approached, the Obama administration appeared positioned to have presided over three definitive foreign-policy outcomes in the broader Middle East for which it could claim substantial credit. The death of Osama bin Laden, while not bringing the war against al-Qaeda to an end, surely closed an important chapter in the long-term struggle against militant Islam. Others will rise to take bin Laden's place at the top of the al-Qaeda hierarchy, but his death leaves a void in that organization that will be hard to fill.
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| 5 |
ID:
154288
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| Summary/Abstract |
The hard reality is that change is not self-generating; yet transformative change is possible, and it starts with transformative leaders.
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