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| 1 |
ID:
109696
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While prior studies have shown that emission rights and futures contracts on emission rights are efficiently priced, there are no studies on the efficiency of the options market. Therefore, this study fills the gap. We examine empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of the options market for emissions rights in Europe. We employ the put-call parity approach to test the efficiency of options on emission rights traded in the European market. This implies that firms can trade options on emission rights in addition to other existing strategies in order to manage their greenhouse gas emissions.
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| 2 |
ID:
137699
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study investigates CO2 emission reduction within the EU resulting from the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) up to 2030. This is performed by constructing a baseline scenario without the ETS and assessing the impacts of the ETS, as currently designed. The results indicate that the ETS will start to impact emissions primarily after 2025 due to the prevalence of a sizable allowance surplus. The impact of approved (i.e. back-loading and 2.2% linear reduction factor (LRF)) and proposed (i.e. market stability reserve (MSR)) policy interventions and the inclusion of aviation,could accelerate the exhaustion of surplus and increase emission reductions during the investigated period. However, these measures would be insufficient to restore the scarcity of allowances and the corresponding carbon price before the start of ETS Phase IV, and the effectiveness of EU-internal abatement cannot be guaranteed until 2023. The effectiveness could be further reduced in the case of the economic shocks or the exclusion of international aviation. To restore the scarcity of allowances, other reform options are necessary. This paper extends the reasoning for the early removal of the back-loaded 900 Mtonne allowances by 2020 and broadening the scope of ETS to other sectors with potential high demand for allowances.
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| 3 |
ID:
166526
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyses the profitability of firms participating in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme during the period from 2006 to 2014, covering the three phases of the scheme. The analysis covers a large dataset from 19 European Union countries and with five different modelling specifications. The examined models use firm-specific attributes, country-level data about the economic environment and energy-related characteristics. In particular, the influences of time/firm/country characteristics on profitability are examined by performing cross-classified multilevel modelling. The empirical results show that both economic and energy-related variables significantly influence firms' profitability. Measures such as reducing environmental impacts (verified emissions and allowances allocated) or increasing energy efficiency should be taken into consideration in decision-making for the firm's profitability improvement.
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| 4 |
ID:
126823
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper, we analyze the rationale for an energy policy mix when the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is considered from a public choice perspective. That is, we argue that the economic textbook model of the ETS implausibly assumes (1) efficient policy design and (2) climate protection as the single objective of policy intervention. Contrary to these assumptions, we propose that the ETS originates from a political bargaining game within a context of multiple policy objectives. In particular, the emissions cap is negotiated between regulators and emitters with the emitters' abatement costs as crucial bargaining variable. This public choice view yields striking implications for an optimal policy mix comprising RES supporting policies. Whereas the textbook model implies that the ETS alone provides sufficient climate protection, our analysis suggests that support for renewable energies (1) contributes to a more effective ETS-design and (2) may even increase the overall efficiency of climate and energy policy if other externalities and policy objectives besides climate protection are considered. Thus, our analysis also shows that a public choice view not necessarily entails negative evaluations concerning efficiency and effectiveness of a policy mix.
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| 5 |
ID:
138919
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2008, the European Union (EU) decided to include aviation in its Emissions Trading System (ETS) in order to realize emissions reductions in the aviation sector. However, the unilateral measure has triggered strong opposition from various actors, and now, the EU finds itself in the middle of a substantial power struggle about the creation of a global scheme for international aviation emissions reduction. China plays an important role as it has not only banned its airlines from complying with the EU ETS, but also implemented economic retaliatory measures, such as freezing orders of new European Airbus aircraft. Consequently, Beijing could successfully form coalitions with other countries to dilute international negotiations at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) assembly in 2013. The study reveals the hardships that the establishment of a global carbon emissions reduction scheme for aviation faces. It discusses the leading role of the EU on the issue, and provides a general assessment of possible responses to the aviation directive. It then analyzes China’s position on the inclusion of aviation under a global carbon reduction scheme. Finally, the study provides a prospect on how to overcome the diplomatic struggle in order to achieve concrete carbon emission reductions in aviation. As the study concludes, the EU and the rest of the world would be better off by refraining from unilateral mitigation measures and emphasizing more involvement, engagement, and capacity building in negotiating a possible carbon reduction scheme at the international level.
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| 6 |
ID:
186482
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| Summary/Abstract |
We examine the economic impacts of using the revenues from environmental taxation to reduce a pre-existing distortionary tax in a multisector economy where the environmental regulation and pre-existing distortionary tax apply heterogeneously across polluting sectors. With a numerical framework including a detailed sectoral disaggregation, we quantify these in the specific case of the European Union where carbon pricing coexists with electricity levies employed to support renewable energy. We find that using auction revenues from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to reduce the national levies results in a 1.8% ETS carbon price increase but a 5.9% drop in the non-ETS carbon constraint. While the energy intensive sectors often benefit from electricity levy exemptions, the combination of these exemptions and of the recycling of carbon auction revenues to support renewable energy makes the ETS sectors worse off than if carbon revenues are transferred to households. In aggregate, the recycling option analysed here results in a GDP gain due to its impacts on the non-ETS sectors, the reduction of the electricity levy and associated distortionary effects.
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