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| 1 |
ID:
109819
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| 2 |
ID:
152015
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.
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| 3 |
ID:
114969
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
An effective police force is central to providing security in general and is considered especially critical in counter-insurgency. The US Army's counter-insurgency doctrine embodied in Field Manual (FM) 3-24 notes that 'the primary frontline [counter-insurgent] force is often the police - not the military'. The strength and effectiveness of the police is important for waging counter-insurgency for two reasons. Firstly, the police can help directly in fighting the insurgents. In Afghanistan, police fight side by side with the military, and help provide security in many of the most dangerous areas. Secondly, building an effective and trustworthy police force is necessary for legitimising the existing government. When the police force fails to provide security (or worse, preys upon the population) the government is delegitimised. At the same time, the population's cooperation with the police is essential for effective policing. Police that are seen as outsiders simply cannot elicit the trust necessary to police a community. The importance of gaining the population's support also echoes the US military's 'population-centric' approach to counter-insurgency, as enumerated by former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders General Stanley McChrystal and General David Petraeus. Support from the population is essential to the police's role in fighting the insurgency since the population can, for example, provide the intelligence essential for identifying, locating and killing insurgents.
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