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| 1 |
ID:
146399
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| 2 |
ID:
141371
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| 3 |
ID:
154355
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzes how Inspire and Dabiq seek to appeal to and radicalize English-speaking Muslims. It examines how each magazine strategically designs ingroup, Other, crisis, and solution constructs and interplays these via value-, dichotomy-, and crisis-reinforcing narratives. This analysis also explores how narrative, imagery, and counternarrative messaging are used to shape readers' perceptions and polarize their support. While both magazines are dominated by narratives designed to empower readers toward action, Inspire relies heavily on identity-choice appeals while Dabiq tends to balance identity- and rational-choice messaging. This study concludes by identifying key lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications campaign and message design.
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| 4 |
ID:
139351
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| Summary/Abstract |
To sum up, what accounts for the rising incidence of internal armed conflicts in plural societies is the interplay of variety of factors ranging from the nature of the polity (i.e. liberal/transitional democratic or autocratic), stage of economic development, level of integration and state-society engagement to the process of state formation and national identity construction.
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| 5 |
ID:
124841
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the National Defense University (NDU) on May 23, 2013, President Barack Obama gave a major speech about terrorismarguing that the time has come to redefine the kind of conflict that the United States has been engaged in since the 9/11 attacks. Obama asserted that ''[w]e must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us.''1 Thus, the President focused part of his speech on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which Congress had passed days after 9/11 and which gave President George W. Bush the authority to go to war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies. Few in Congress who voted for this authorization understood that they were voting for what has become the United States' longest war, one that has expanded in recent years to countries such as Pakistan and Yemen
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| 6 |
ID:
131982
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past few years there is an apparent re-regionalization of al-Qaeda activity, intensified by the ongoing Middle East turmoil. Its main characteristic is a trend towards the abandonment of focoist strategies and their replacement by more popular-based ones. This article aims at evaluating their capacity to implement such a strategy shift and sustain the required level of violence. As a means of evaluating this capacity, this article proposes the use of a DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) framework, which will hopefully provide an alternative angle of theorizing and understanding 'armed non-state actors' (ANSAs). The model is applied in the case of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which appears to have effectively developed the military and informational dimensions, due partly to its own prowess and partly to the Yemeni state's weaknesses and the shortcomings of counterinsurgency. In contrast, the economic and diplomatic dimensions suffer from the lack of resources and the anti-systemic nature of AQAP.
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| 7 |
ID:
109838
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| 8 |
ID:
140424
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| 9 |
ID:
160999
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| Summary/Abstract |
The number of US drone strikes against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen has increased significantly since 2010, but received limited academic attention. This article examines the effectiveness of this drone campaign using an existing theoretical framework. Crucially, we contribute to the framework by adding a fourth intervening variable, namely target correspondence. Through a single case study, it is found that drones have only enjoyed limited success in degrading AQAP's hierarchical structure, qualified human resources and access to key material resources, and in some cases – owing to our target correspondence analysis – this limited success has come at a price. It is found that drones have temporarily disrupted AQAP by successfully eliminating senior leaders involved in coordinating and overseeing external operations. Overall, AQAP's ability to hit Western targets remains significant.
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| 10 |
ID:
139703
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