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| 1 |
ID:
127812
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From a theory on occupying regimes and from traditional concepts of counterinsurgency theory, the author traces back the development of the Dutch discourse regarding present day missions. The genesis of the so-called Dutch approach is studied, and the case of Uruzgan is reviewed by scrutinizing political, security, economic, and governance aspects of the use of the military in the aforementioned province of Afghanistan. The case is studied to determine whether there really is something Dutch about this approach. We learn that the "Dutch approach" is predominantly a narrative whose main objective is the appeasement of Dutch public opinion and the legitimation of Dutch policy making. At the same time and even though more comparative case studies are necessary, it seems plausible that the Dutch approach is different. But the difference is not typical Dutch; it lies in the manner of collaborating with and co-opting indigenous elites. Studying the genesis of the "Dutch approach" is therefore an analysis of a discourse and a study in operational effectiveness at the same time.
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| 2 |
ID:
109957
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the so-called 'Dutch approach' to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the 'Dutch approach' in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term 'Dutch approach' turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.
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| 3 |
ID:
127188
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Professor Joseph Soeters shows admirable ambition in comparing national styles of conflict resolution and is extremely eager to draw historical lessons from such comparative exercises. However, he gets entangled in national mythmaking as he underestimates the complexity of comparative history of this kind. Particularly the establishment of true causal links between national (strategic) cultures and actual tactical behaviour on the ground is far more difficult than he suggests in his recent book chapter and his reply to my article in this journal.
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| 4 |
ID:
127174
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful 'Dutch approach' to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.
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