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| 1 |
ID:
171209
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| Summary/Abstract |
No issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution – two-tiered security systems – is particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These systems’ defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but inhibit rapid regime change through coup d’état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were recruited.
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| 2 |
ID:
177991
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| Summary/Abstract |
State investments in domestic defence industries are one of the most puzzling trends in international relations. Economists contend that these investments waste resources, while political scientists claim that armaments’ resultant overproduction fuels arms races. Why then do governments cultivate defence industries? I draw on cases from Israel, South Africa and Iraq to argue that the answers to these questions are distinct. Fears about supply security frequently spur states to begin developing arms industries, and elites’ techno-nationalist beliefs often sustain their defence-industrial investments. Defence industries’ primary national security value, however, lies in their hitherto unappreciated contribution to states’ military adaptation capacity.
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| 3 |
ID:
110876
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reacting to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, two European states, the United Kingdom and France, contributed large forces and participated in land, air, and sea operations. The contributions of these states varied considerably in their composition and role. The United Kingdom deployed as many forces (45,000 personnel) as the country could manage, while France sent a significant force (15,000) that fell short of its potential. Once in Arabia, the British played a major role in coalition planning, while the French remained operationally aloof. Finally, when it came to launch offensive operations, British forces were central to the coalition's riskiest endeavors, such as special forces raids and preparing a fake amphibious invasion, while French forces played a credible, but less dangerous role. This article tests the ability of realism and historic institutionalism to explain these different responses to the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis. Although realism appears a priori to possess a high degree of explanatory power, a detailed process tracing analysis reveals that historical institutionalism can better account for the different outcomes observed.
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| 4 |
ID:
123399
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few issues are more important to international relations scholars than understanding how globalization is shaping the production of armaments. Within this context, this article examines both whether and how small and medium states can maintain defense-industrial bases capable of contributing to their national security. To preview the conclusion, although defense-industrial self-sufficiency has become an illusion for most states, even small and medium states can develop defense-industrial capabilities that enhance both their ability to autonomously employ their armed forces and secure access to foreign armaments. Moreover, governments possess a range of options for achieving these objectives, including a fundamental choice between accepting foreign direct investment and pursuing unrestrained arms exports. Governments unwilling to sanction foreign ownership of their defense industries can have recourse to unrestricted exports; alternatively, states uncomfortable with liberal exports can encourage foreign direct investment. With this in mind, a lasting diversity is likely to persist in even similarly endowed states' defense industries and defense-industrial policies.
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| 5 |
ID:
170459
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Few issues are more important to security-studies scholars than understanding how violent non-state groups innovate. To shed new light on this subject, we examine Hezbollah’s innovations and the underlying processes that produced them. Based on this case, the most successful violent non-state groups are arguably those that systematically pursue incremental innovation. Although less dramatic than their discontinuous counterparts, a commitment to steadily improve an organizations' tactics and techniques can have dramatic effects. Indeed, even Hezbollah’s remarkable performance during the 2006 Lebanon War is attributable to the perfection of techniques utilized since the organization's inception. While innovations were incremental in character, a bottom-up process of learning and experimentation by field commanders was critical to generating most of these innovations. If generalizable to other violent non-state actors, these findings suggest that the most formidable insurgent and terrorist groups will actually be those that relentlessly pursue incremental innovations in a bottom-up fashion.
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| 6 |
ID:
138787
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| 7 |
ID:
122295
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article expands our understanding of how states respond militarily to threats and challenges by examining how organizational culture and institutional policymaking structures shape states' use of force. To evaluate the explanatory power of culture and institutions, I analyze the effect of each variable on how the United Kingdom and France conduct counterinsurgency operations. To preview the conclusions, although both organizational culture and institutional structures provide insights into how states fight insurgencies, institutional structures are much more decisive in shaping outcomes. In states where policymaking institutions promote maximal political control of the armed forces, the result will be strategic satisficing, whereby restricted force is surgically employed, along with diplomacy, to achieve the state's limited goals while minimizing the risks of casualties and/or escalation. Contrarily, in states where institutions accord operational autonomy to the armed forces, commanders will pursue their preference for decisive military victory by applying overwhelming force and conducting operations that risk escalating conflicts. In contrast to institutions, organizational culture plays a more modest role, limited to shaping how military leaders initially conceptualize the challenges they face and the techniques they employ at the tactical level. Thus, institutional structures, rather than organizational culture, offer a more convincing argument for why similar states, facing comparable challenges, use force in systematically different ways.
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| 8 |
ID:
130407
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Budgetary pressures have driven a steady expansion of armaments collaboration projects internationally. This has also been the case in Europe where it is estimated that currently one-fifth of European procurement budgets are spent on collaborative weapons systems and the European Defence Agency has the long-term objective of increasing this figure by over 50%. The purpose of this article is to assess whether collaborative armaments projects can offer the benefits frequently attributed to them. To this end, the study examines the five combat aircraft projects that European states have collaboratively undertaken since the 1950s.
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| 9 |
ID:
109958
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen and the multiplication of subversive movements in the United Kingdom's Gulf protectorates, British policymakers genuinely feared the spread of communism throughout southern Arabia. Defeating the People's Front for the Liberation for the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province was considered central to preventing such an outcome. In their pursuit of victory, British officers overthrew the sultan of Oman, escalated the war by conducting attacks in South Yemen, and, ultimately, appealed to Islam as a means of rallying support against communism. However, lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies (Malaya, Kenya, and Borneo) proved of only limited value in Oman's physical and cultural environment. Unfortunately, none of these measures worked as anticipated. Only Iran's direct military intervention and the dramatic growth of Oman's financial resources after the 1973 oil crisis provided the resources to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Even so, victory was only achieved in 1975 because the rebellion's leaders unwisely attempted to oppose the Anglo-Omani offensives conventionally.
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| 10 |
ID:
190874
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| 11 |
ID:
114215
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few issues are more important to scholars of Europe's emergence as a foreign policy actor than whether the European Union (EU) can forge a common defense-industrial policy out of 27 states' procurement policies and defense industries. Overlooked in most scholarly analyses of European defense-industrial cooperation, the story of Europe's international armaments organizations stretches back more than six decades. In this article, we examine the impact of past institutional outcomes on the defense-industrial field by applying the concepts and analytic tools of historic institutionalism to European armaments organizations. Because past institutional dynamics have channeled the subsequent development of armaments cooperation, what has emerged is a polycentric governance architecture wherein organizations with transatlantic, pan-European and restrictive-European memberships dominate distinct components of the cooperative process. We demonstrate that this maturing institutional pattern will likely limit the opportunities for the EU - and especially its Commission - to shape the future contours of European defense-industrial cooperation.
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| 12 |
ID:
138765
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nothing is more important to Europe’s future as a security actor than supplying its armed forces with modern weaponry. Because individual states lack the research and development budgets and scale economies to remain autarkic, the survival of Europe’s defence-industrial base depends on international cooperation. As in other areas of international affairs, the ability of states to cooperate ‘under anarchy’ is inextricably tied to the existence of international institutions. However, the nature of arms production renders the design of institutions particularly challenging. Problems lie in both the multiplicity of potential cooperative outcomes and the variety of policy tools available. Ultimately, the choice of policies and policy tools can generate friction between the key groups of actors involved in defence-industrial policymaking. This study systematically explores how variations in the structure of international armaments institutions have shaped both the influence of different groups of actors and the nature of collaborative weapons projects. To preview my conclusions, three broad trends can be observed in the evolution of armaments institutions. These are as follows: (1) the gradual incorporation of a larger number of actors into the arms cooperation process; (2) the incremental exclusion of military professionals from armaments institutions; and (3) the growing influence of corporate actors.
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| 13 |
ID:
143684
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few factors have a greater impact on the international distribution of power than states’ ability to develop and produce sophisticated weaponry. The Israeli and Swedish cases demonstrate the constraints and opportunities for small states’ defense-industrial bases in a globalizing world. The changing nature of arms production—including mounting weapons costs, globalized supply chains and the rise of multinational defense corporations—forced governments to reevaluate their defense-industrial policies. In each case, governments abandoned the pursuit of defense-industrial self-sufficiency and adopted export-dependent defenseindustrial policies. National strategies differ, however, with Sweden embracing foreign direct investment (FDI) to support incremental innovation and Israel encouraging companies to tap venture capital in pursuit of disruptive innovations. After a decade of sustained growth, the Israeli and Swedish defense-industrial bases today arguably suffer from structural weaknesses rooted in the adaptation policies each state adopted in prior decades and, more particularly, how each encouraged exports and drew on new forms of investment capital.
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| 14 |
ID:
172568
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few innovations have marked the late-20th and early-21st centuries more than unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones. Drones’ current preeminence leads many to assume that their development was teleologically determined by technological advances. The empirical record, however, belies such assumptions and is filled with vicissitudes. The Air Force’s and Naval aviation’s pilot-dominated hierarchies never prioritized drones over manned aircraft of their own accord. Politicians, meanwhile, lacked the expertise to judge what technologies could achieve and therefore could not compel the military to embrace drones. It was, thus, competition from other organizations – the CIA, the Navy’s surface warfare community and the Army –that obliged reluctant aviators to embrace drones. My study’s key original finding is that inter-agency competition impels militaries to embrace technologies that they would otherwise reject. Warfare’s evolution means that non-military bodies – intelligence agencies, interior ministries and paramilitary forces – develop capabilities that rival those of traditional military services in specific domains and these organizations can prove more agile at adopting certain new technologies because of their flatter organizational structures.
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| 15 |
ID:
179432
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| Summary/Abstract |
During revolutions, strategic interactions among civilian policy makers, armed forces, and opposition groups shape political outcomes—most important, whether a regime stands or falls. Students from advanced industrial democracies frequently find these dynamics counterintuitive, even after completing readings and engaging in traditional instruction methods. We therefore sought to improve pedagogical outcomes by designing a simulation based on scenarios similar to those witnessed during the Arab Spring and Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution. We divided students into four teams representing the regime, the armed forces, and two distinct groups of anti-regime dissidents. Rules were designed to incorporate the best recent scholarship on each category of actors’ behavior, such as the probability of military units defecting to protesters and the ability of riot police to repress urban uprisings. By forcing student teams to make decisions under time pressure, we obliged them to wrestle with the uncertainties and fears of betrayal inherent in complex civil–military emergencies.
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| 16 |
ID:
153709
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few issues are more important yet less understood than how the domestic production of armaments impacts military power. Scholars generally explain states’ drive to develop defense industries in terms of a quest for supply security. Technological changes are, however, rendering an “autonomy preference” increasingly unaffordable. This raises the question of whether states can still derive strategic value from their defense industries. This study addresses the issue by examining whether Israel’s and Serbia’s defense industrial bases contributes to either the traditional goal of supply security or the alternative objective of military adaptability. To preview the conclusion, the strategic value that most states can extract from domestic defense firms lies in enhanced military adaptability. This advantage is far from negligible. Since war is unpredictable, it is often the side that adapts most rapidly to unexpected circumstances that prevails. Domestic defense industries contribute significantly to adapt both because of their technical capabilities and their patterns of routinized cooperation with a states’ armed force. Supply security, by way of contrast, is today unattainable for all but the largest states.
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