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| 1 |
ID:
110076
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do large domestic and multinational enterprises choose one Chinese city over the others in which to set up their company headquarters? What could the Chinese local governments do in order to attract enterprises to establish headquarters in their localities? Following the Chinese commonly used term 'headquarter economy' and investigating the issue mostly from the local governments' perspective, this research examines two cases, Pudong and Shenzhen, to see how they have capitalized on their local advantages and attracted different types of large investments. Both the Pudong and Shenzhen governments provide preferential policies and administrative reforms to build a good investment environment and to develop a 'headquarter economy'. Their preferential policies are similar in design but different in content, so as to attract different target investors. Their administrative reforms are similar in direction but with variations in pace and design for implementation. Our conclusion shows that 'headquarter economy' is a concept flexibly used and wisely adopted by Chinese local governments to develop local economies.
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| 2 |
ID:
169398
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| Summary/Abstract |
Local governments in China have been frequently blamed for the deteriorating environmental conditions due to their failure to implement and enforce national environmental laws. To improve local governments' environmental performance, the recently amended Environmental Protection Law provides a comprehensive responsibility system to hold local officials accountable. However, the underlying reasons behind local governments' failures, as the author argues, are much more complicated than they may appear. While variables like motivation, incentives and capacity are widely recognised as key factors in successful implementation of the new law, the transparency, accuracy and rigidity of legal provisions are equally important. When the new law is ambiguous and fails to explicitly delegate responsibilities, local leaders become confused about their environmental responsibilities and may act improperly to cheat the accountability system. All of these variables must be understood in the current context of central–local relations which informs local governments' identity, decision-making process and law implementation.
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| 3 |
ID:
123958
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the early 1980s, Chinese local governments have collected a significant amount of revenue outside the budgetary system. Fiscal shortage is commonly cited as the main reason for local extra-budgetary finance. However, a panel data analysis on provincial extra-budgetary practices reveals a different story. The findings suggest that extra-budgetary finance exists in China not as a strategy for local fiscal survival, but rather because local bureaucracies can conveniently exploit their administrative power to extract revenue from the local economy, and that extra-budgetary exactions fall disproportionately on peasants. Despite the constant calls by the central government to reform and regulate the extra-budgetary system, the centrally issued administrative directives have little impact on local practices.
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