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MOORE, S K (1) answer(s).
 
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Is the maritime domain a security vulnerability to be exploited / Moore, S K   Journal Article
Moore, S K Journal Article
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Publication 2011.
Summary/Abstract The modern Olympic Games are large and complex enough to be termed 'mega events'. They use enormous resources; human, physical and financial. The effects of such investments are significant and long-lived for the host country; both urban infrastructure and security measures must be meticulously planned to ensure the event's success. In the case of London 2012, there was less than 24 hours between the announcement that London would be the host, and the tragic events of the July bombings, meaning that Britain's Olympic Games would forever be inextricably linked with terrorism. This paper examines whether the forthcoming Olympic Games has been used as an opportunity to ensure that Britain's maritime flank is as well protected as it can be. It will ask whether there is a credible threat to the UK from the maritime domain, both during the event, and once it has finished. It will look at how the Government views the issue of defence of our homeland waters from threats, what work has been done to mitigate risks to the Olympics, and whether, once the closing ceremony has finished, the unique opportunities offered by the hosting of such event has made us safer. It will conclude that there is a credible threat of attack on the UK's way of life, either at, or from the sea, but despite this, the Government is taking a strategic risk in relying on the maritime environment to deliver over 90 per cent of our trade. Not only that, the Government has directed that security for the Olympics will be based on 'business as usual', and so the hosting of the largest event on the planet has potentially been a missed opportunity to focus on strengthening our security structures. Current Government Foreign and Defence Policies provide little opportunity for re-visiting our homeland security strategy, despite predictions of security requirements to preserve our way of life becoming future defence priorities. In this era of fiscal strain, ever fewer assets and capabilities, and our reliance on the sea for our very survival, the homeland maritime domain has never looked so vulnerable.
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