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ID:
122503
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The incidents in the Depsang Plain, near the Karakoram Pass in April or more recently, in Chumar in South Ladakh, are the continuance of Nehru's blind spot for China. There is today a huge difference of 'perception' on the location of the Line of Actual Control which over the years has been moving towards the South and the West. The 1959 LAC was indeed far more advantageous for India than the present LAC.
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| 2 |
ID:
127933
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's growing military build-up and increasing assertiveness against its neighbouring countries has been a reason for concern to many nations. China has territorial and maritime disputes with many of its neighbours . Their major dispute is with Taiwan. Both the countries claim to be the legitimate government of China. China claims to be a part of its territory and has openly stated that it will be ready to use force. If required, to annex Taiwan. China also claims Senkaku islands, also claomed by Japan, as theirs. Another dispute area is Paracel island which is occupied by China but Claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam. China is also involved in a dispute with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal. The Spratly islands are another complex bone of contention between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. With India, the border dispute has not yet been resolved.
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| 3 |
ID:
128666
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| 4 |
ID:
118112
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| 5 |
ID:
172790
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Galwan incident that occurred between China and India near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in early June carries with it extremely acute consequences on the bilateral, regional, and global levels. The world’s two most populous nations are destined to intensify their competition with one another at all levels irrespective of whatever they might say to the contrary. Both countries must recognise this inevitability, prepare themselves accordingly, but importantly retain reliable channels of communication in order to manage their rivalry as responsibly as possible given the mutually disastrous outcome of a conventional war by miscalculation that might easily spiral out of control.
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| 6 |
ID:
121082
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The intrusion by the Chinese Army in the Ladakh sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was first reported by the media on 15 April 2013. Initial reports indicated that about 30-40 armed soldiers of the Chinese Army had set up three to four tents in the area of Depsang Bulge, south east of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). Subsequently, media reports indicated that the Government had accepted this intrusion to be 19 km from the LAC, inside Indian territory. The Depsang Bulge is east of the River Shyok and close to DBO, an old forward airfield, recently activated as part of the infrastructure development plan of the Indian armed forces in the Ladakh sector. The intrusion became significant because it was the first time that a transgressing patrol had set up camp and indicated its will to continue to stay put and proclaim, by way of banners, the area to be Chinese territory.
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| 7 |
ID:
127942
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China and India enjoy relative peace between them and have avoided another war after the one fought in 1962. However, at times, there have been clashes and crisis along the line of actual control (LAC) that have put to test the conflict management skills of political and military leadership of both the countries. On each occasion, it shook India's public opinion. The summer crisis in 2013 was no different. As the Chinese PLA seized the opportunity and lay tents almost 19 km inside the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Daulti Beg Oldi (DBO) sector during April 15-May 5, 2013, The Indian public opinion was up in arms. The President refusal on the part of Chinese troops to withdraw only raised the stakes in the crisis. Concurrently, the government of India faced unprecedented strong domestic criticism over handling of relation with China in general and the border intrusion in particular.
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| 8 |
ID:
110170
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| 9 |
ID:
149306
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Aleph Book Company, 2017.
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| Description |
xxi, 458p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789382277262
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058912 | 327.151054/SAW 058912 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
122158
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| 11 |
ID:
138639
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There are multiple interpretations of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to China. Fundamentally, while there has been significant movement on the economic side in terms of trade, investment and opening of markets, there has been little progress on major irritants such as boundary or water issues. There remains an unmistakable shadow of lack of mutual trust and unwillingness on the part of the Chinese to significantly address these irritants. In fact, during the visit an attempt was made to vitiate the atmosphere by showing an Indian map exclusive of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh.
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| 12 |
ID:
138130
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Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature. The 2005 Agreement on the ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India–China Boundary Question’ acknowledged as much: the ‘two sides are seeking a political settlement of the boundary question’.2 In future India–China boundary negotiations, will the two leaders go for territorial exchange or will they remain content with the status quo, and simply define the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?
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| 13 |
ID:
127877
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| 14 |
ID:
172760
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| 15 |
ID:
172788
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since early May this year, troops from China’s People’s Liberation Army and Indian Army have been in a tense standoff in eastern Ladakh along what is known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a term first used by China’s premier, Zhou En Lai, and rejected by India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
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| 16 |
ID:
127757
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| 17 |
ID:
122560
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| 18 |
ID:
172772
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has been an unusually busy summer for the ministry of defence (MoD). On the one hand, since early 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has been carrying out minor transgressions all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) from Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim to Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, firmly stationed itself in eastern and south-eastern Ladakh in April.
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| 19 |
ID:
145368
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| Summary/Abstract |
The protracted unresolved border dispute between India and China has transformed the subcontinent into a locus of sustained geopolitical rivalry. The total disputed area between the two countries runs to approximately 1,35,000 sq. km. and in the absence of a well-demarcated border, a Line of Actual Control is employed by both sides to claim the area up to which each side has effective military control. Except the limited but intense war in 1962 and the direct military confrontation in 1986-87, major escalated conflicts along the border have been prevented by adept diplomatic measures and understanding between the two sides. The trajectory of conflict resolution and peace management along the Sino-India border forms a significant foreign policy discourse and the manner in which a mutually acceptable permanent solution to the dispute is reached would be of great interest and concern not only for the region, but also the international community at large.
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| 20 |
ID:
115955
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