| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After decades of trying, Europe still does not get the best value out of the substantial amounts it spends on defence. The experience of the past 20 years suggests that European countries will continue to need to deploy forces in a wide range of operations for a wide range of tasks. Yet defence spending is in a decline that is unlikely to be reversed unless there is a major strategic shock. These two facts suggest that Europe's armed forces will be increasingly squeezed and forced to look for new solutions. They have been under pressure for some time to deliver more effective capabilities with smaller resources, but cuts in spending necessitated by budgetary austerity suggest that these pressures could become acute. European countries can still have strong, and more effective, militaries, but to do so they must make better use of their financial resources.
It is not a matter of falling in with the desperate demand of former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who in 2011 joined the long line of US officials calling for a stronger effort from Europe. It is up to European countries, not the United States, to determine themselves what capabilities they need to deal with the threats they perceive. The present security situation offers plenty of uncertainties, such as those created by the Arab Awakening in Europe's neighbourhood, but no new direct and existential threats to the security of European countries. The diffuse nature of threats in an uncertain world has contributed to a general vagueness about the purpose of maintaining armed forces: defence-policy documents developed since the Balkan conflicts have tended to be laundry lists of potentially dangerous issues with little attempt to prioritise.
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