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ID:
110417
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Small Renewable Energy Power (SREP) Program was the premier policy mechanism implemented by the national government to promote small-scale renewable electricity in Malaysia from 2001 to 2010. However, it managed meet less than 3 percent of its original goal by 2005. This study investigates what happened. More specifically, using a qualitative semi-structured interview approach with data presented in a narrative format, it answers the following five questions: (1) What are the primary energy policy and security challenges facing Malaysia? (2) What were the drivers behind the SREP in Malaysia? (3) What were the major benefits arising from the SREP? (4) What were the significant challenges to implementation? (5) What lessons or insights does the SREP offer for the study of energy policy design and implementation more generally? We find that the SREP failed to achieve its targets due to capacity caps, a lengthy approval process, lack of monitoring, exclusion of stakeholders, and few (if any) pre-feasibility studies. Other factors explaining its poor performance include opposition from the national utility Tenaga Nasional Berhad and electricity tariffs unmatched with true production costs.
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| 2 |
ID:
192742
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper addresses the challenges of governing energy procurement from a mix of non-hydropower renewable energy sources supplied by independent producers. Building on political economy analysis and five case studies of independent producer projects from Ethiopia, it seeks to understand the root causes of the protracted delays and limited extent of procurement by independent producers. Unlike previous research, this paper found little resistance by the incumbent (in this case a heavily hydropower dependent state-owned enterprise) to transition to non-hydropower sources, nor to private sector supply. However, competing interests and tensions among key stakeholders over procurement processes prevailed. The key contestations lie in managing long term contracts, risk, uncertainty and in developing the institutional and human capacity to transition. Procurement via private suppliers will inevitably require a competent governance arrangement cognizant of the suitability of energy sector structure to transition. In the Ethiopian case, the bundling of power generation, transmission, and off-taker roles hampers competition. In the face of risk-averse multinational independent producers, the paper argues for a green industrial policy aimed at developing a vibrant domestic private renewables sector contributing to universal access to sustainable and affordable electricity.
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| 3 |
ID:
188545
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| Summary/Abstract |
The small island economy of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is facing severe electricity shortages and is therefore turning to implementing broader power sector reforms as a vehicle to attract private capital and investments in electricity generation. This study, based on a case-study approach, revisits the reform progress and plans in the electricity sector of PNG alongside the development and integration of IPPs in its small power system. Lessons of reform experiences and IPPs integration are drawn from three other smaller systems of Nepal, Nicaragua and the Northern Territory of Australia including stakeholder consultations, which includes two IPPs of PNG. We find a widening gap between reform ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ in the PNG power sector. Cost reflective pricing is implemented while cost recovery is never achieved by the vertically integrated state-owned utility and the insolvency of this state-owned single buyer poses the greatest perceived revenue risk to the IPPs. This lack of revenue reimbursement to the IPPs by the single buyer is a barrier towards attracting private capital into electricity generation. We recommend that strong political will and strengthening of institutional arrangements are urgent reform measures to attract private capital in power generation as political instability continue.
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