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PUBLIC THREATS
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
110538
Cost of empty threats: a Penny, not a pound
/ Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D
Snyder, Jack
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2011.
Summary/Abstract
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real-as opposed to simulated-crises. We look for such evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders see unambiguously committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader's words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care about their country's reputation for resolve and national honor independent of whether the leader has issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs as secondary mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were made.
Key Words
Domestic Politics
;
Authoritarian
;
Democratic Threats
;
Public Threats
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2
ID:
125134
Limited audience costs in international crises
/ Tarar, Ahmer; Levento?lu, Bahar
Tarar, Ahmer
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2013.
Summary/Abstract
Do audience costs have to be extremely large in order to credibly signal resolve and affect international crises? Existing theoretical work on audience costs suggests an affirmative answer, and recent empirical work on audience costs focuses on whether a leader can generate such large audience costs as to create a commitment to fight where no such commitment previously existed. We analyze a richer crisis bargaining model with audience costs and find that (1) audience costs can have war-reducing effects on incomplete-information crisis bargaining through a noninformative, bargaining-leverage mechanism and (2) audience costs can have war-reducing effects even when such large audience costs are not being generated as to create a commitment to fight where no such commitment previously existed. Even more limited audience costs can have war-reducing effects in international crises. We discuss how the bargaining-leverage mechanism is consistent with a number of prominent historical cases
Key Words
Economics
;
International Economics
;
crisis
;
Bargaining
;
Audience Costs
;
International crises
;
Credible Commitment
;
Public Threats
;
Credible Signaling
;
Economic Condition
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