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DOMESTIC PUNISHMENT (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   153602


(In)compatibility of peace and justice? the International Criminal Court and civil conflict termination / Prorok, Alyssa K   Journal Article
Prorok, Alyssa K Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Does the International Criminal Court's (ICC) pursuit of justice facilitate peace or prolong conflict? This paper addresses the “peace versus justice” debate by examining the ICC's impact on civil conflict termination. Active ICC involvement in a conflict increases the threat of punishment for rebel and state leaders, which, under certain conditions, generates incentives for these leaders to continue the conflict as a way to avoid capture, transfer to the Hague, and prosecution. The impact of ICC involvement is conditional upon the threat of domestic punishment that leaders face; as the risk of domestic punishment increases, the conflict-prolonging effects of ICC involvement diminish. I test these theoretical expectations on a data set of all civil conflict dyads from 2002 to 2013. Findings support the hypothesized relationship. Even after addressing potential selection and endogeneity concerns, I find that active involvement by the ICC significantly decreases the likelihood of conflict termination when the threat of domestic punishment is relatively low.
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2
ID:   110539


Decider's dilemma: leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment / Croco, Sarah E   Journal Article
Croco, Sarah E Journal Article
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Publication 2011.
Summary/Abstract A leader's culpability for involving his state in a conflict affects both his war termination calculus and his domestic audience's willingness to punish him if he loses. I define a culpable leader as any leader who either presides over the beginning of a war, or comes to power midwar and shares a political connection with a culpable predecessor. Using a data set created specifically for this study, I find that culpable leaders are more likely than nonculpable ones to achieve favorable war outcomes. I also find that domestic audiences will be willing to punish culpable leaders who lose, yet spare nonculpable leaders who do the same. Taken together, my findings underscore the need to appreciate more fully the role individual leaders play in bringing their states to war.
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