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| 1 |
ID:
116744
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Brazil, the consensus that natural gas regulation has failed to attract investments, especially from private companies, culminated in a new law for the natural gas sector, passed in March 2009 (Law No. 11,909). The most significant change this new law introduced was the new governmental role in co-ordinating investments in the transportation sector. The Brazilian government has had to plan pipeline networks, estimate the size of demand for transportation and organise bidding to select investors for new pipeline projects. Although the law has established a clear regulatory framework for the midstream sector, providing stability and the legal certainty necessary for long-term investments in assets with high specificity, it has not been able to fill all of the gaps that remain under Law 9,478. In this sense, besides the challenges related to effective implementation of the regulatory attributes defined in Law 11,909, the absence of certain issues prevents the modified legal structure from encouraging the entry of new players in the transportation sector. This paper has identified, according to the neo-institutional view, the mechanisms of co-ordination introduced by the new law and the limitations of the new regulatory framework.
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| 2 |
ID:
110581
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2011,
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyzes the value and cost of line-pack flexibility in liberalized gas markets through examination of the techno-economic characteristics of gas transport pipelines and the trade-offs between different ways to use the infrastructure: transport and flexibility. Line-pack flexibility is becoming increasingly important as a tool to balance gas supply and demand over different periods. In the European liberalized market context, a monopolist unbundled network operator offers regulated transport services and flexibility (balancing) services according to the network code and balancing rules. Therefore, gas policy makers should understand the role and consequences of line-pack regulation. The analysis shows that the line-pack flexibility service has an important economic value for the shippers and the TSO. Furthermore, the analysis identifies distorting effects in the gas market due to inadequate regulation of line-pack flexibility: by disregarding the sunk costs of flexibility in the balancing rules, the overall efficiency of the gas system is decreased. Finally, the analysis demonstrates that the actual costs of line-pack flexibility are related to the peak cumulative imbalance throughout the balancing period. Any price for pipeline flexibility should, therefore, be based on the related trade-off between the right to use the line-pack flexibility and the provision of transport services
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| 3 |
ID:
126526
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the EU, gas markets are based on socializing network flexibility services. However, shippers have different preferences on network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction of auction mechanisms to allocate network services in the short run. The auction aims to represent simultaneously the diversity of players' preferences and the trade-offs implied by network constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed: (a) an auction based on bids for gas, which allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences; (b) an auction with explicit bids for line-pack, which allows shippers' valuation of line-pack storage.
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