| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
110602
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) voted overwhelmingly on Dec. 1 to approve a document that reaffirms the importance of the treaty's April 2012 deadline for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles but does not say countries that failed to meet the deadline would be violating the terms of the pact.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
191978
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the shifting focus of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) during the first 25 years of its implementation, from the verification of destruction of declared chemical-weapon (CW) stockpiles to the attribution of CW use. The article identifies the repeated use of chemical weapons by Syria and the resultant creation of a new attribution norm under the CWC as a critical juncture in the regime’s evolution. Repeated calls for accountability for the use of so-called Novichok nerve agents for assassination purposes serve as the first manifestation of the new attribution norm. The article further outlines steps CWC states parties should take in the context of the Fifth CWC Review Conference in May 2023 to prepare the CW-prohibition regime for its next 25 years of operation by (1) adapting the implementation of key regime norms following the anticipated completion of CW destruction later in 2023 and (2) incorporating the investigation and attribution work of the Investigation and Identification Team into the programmatic work of the OPCW.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
173022
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The global inventory of chemical weapons was once enormous, especially in the United States and Soviet Union, but today 98 percent of them have been destroyed. Most of this destruction took place after the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) took effect in 1997, and the treaty’s implementation body, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), has verified the elimination process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
131241
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation have received a great deal of academic attention. However, nuclear weapons are rarely discussed in isolation in policy circles. Instead, nuclear weapons are relevant as part of a category of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that includes chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). Are the factors that drive CBWs proliferation similar to those that drive nuclear proliferation? What is the relationship between these weapons types? In this article, we explore whether nuclear weapons and CBWs serve as complements or substitutes. Using newly collected data on both CBWs pursuit and possession over time, we find that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons generally function as complements at the pursuit stage. In addition, countries that acquire nuclear weapons become less interested in pursuing other types of WMDs and are even willing to give them up in some cases.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
121711
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Differences over language addressing the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria sharply divided the recent review conference of states-parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), according to official statements at the conference and interviews with key participants and observers in recent weeks. Some diplomats, speaking on background, described the conference as being on the verge of failing to reach agreement on a final document over the differences on how to deal with that subject.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
121717
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The U.S. intelligence community has "high confidence" that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons on a small scale against opposition forces multiple times over the past year, the White House said in a June 13 statement.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|