|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
148531
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the geostrategic implications of the 2014 Philippine-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in terms of U.S. utilization of the five agreed locations in the Philippines. The Philippines negotiated this pact because of its limited defense capabilities and China`s heavy-handed handling of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off. The two allies discussed the terms and conditions from September 2013 to March 2014 and signed the agreement in late April 2014. In January 2016, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled in favor of the EDCA setting in motion the deployment of American forces in the Philippines. Currently, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) maintains a small contingent of aircraft and personnel in Philippine territory. This presence in five Philippine Air Force (PAF) bases marks the return of U.S. airpower which can be projected deep into China`s near sea defense zone. Only time will tell if the allies can fully develop a formidable deterrent posture to constrain China`s expansionist moves in the South China Sea.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
110797
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how the South China Sea dispute impacts on the Aquino
administration's 2011 decision to shift the focus of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from internal security to territorial defense. Upon assuming
office in 2010, President Benigno Aquino announced his intention to modernize
the AFP, to buttress the country's territorial defense, and to check China's
aggressive assertion of its sovereignty over the South China Sea. However, the
lack of financial support from the Philippine Congress prevented the immediate
implementation of the plan. The March 2, 2011 incident between a Philippine
survey ship and two Chinese patrol boats at Reed Bank, however, prompted the
Aquino administration to redirect the country's security focus. The incident also
triggered a strong clamor from the military and other government institutions for
the allocation of resources to the development of the AFP's territorial defense
capabilities. China's heavy-handed behavior in the South China Sea, as well as its
uncompromising diplomatic posturing, further convinced the Aquino administration
of the inevitability of facing China militarily in the near future. Coincidentally,
the United States supports the Philippines' shift to territorial/maritime defense
and pledges to provide its ally with affordable military hardware. In conclusion, the
article observes that the convergence of strategic and diplomatic events-an offshoot
of the March 2 Reed Bank incident-finally made the Aquino administration and
the AFP take the first step in the long and arduous process of building a modest
military capability for territorial defense.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
128473
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines why and how small powers balance big powers. One such small power is the Philippines, which-despite its military weakness- applies a balancing policy on an emergent China relative to the South China Sea imbroglio. Largely, this balancing policy is the upshot of three developments: a) the present Aquino Administration's efforts to disassociate itself from the previous Arroyo Administration's policy of equi-balancing China and the U.S.; b) China's heavy-handed behavior in the South China Sea dispute; and c) the willingness of the U.S. to assist the Philippines in constraining an assertive China. In conclusion, the article offers two reasons why this balancing policy is risky and difficult. First, the Philippines needs time and resources to develop the military capability to back its territorial claim in the South China Sea; and second, the U.S., though supportive of the Philippine position, is wary of triggering a full-blown geo-strategic rivalry with China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
149530
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Three and a half years after the Philippines took the unprecedented step of challenging the legal basis of China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, the Arbitral Tribunal established under compulsory dispute resolution provisions contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and based at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, issued its final ruling on 12 July 2016.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
145528
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite sharing many strategic interests, Indonesia and Australia have often struggled to forge effective security cooperation. In this article, the authors evaluate the ‘Bandung divide’ as a potential explanation for this difficulty. The ‘Bandung divide’ refers to the legacies of the 1955 Asian-African Conference, which saw Indonesia and Australia adopt different normative orientations towards the liberal international order, and divergent security strategies for South-East Asia. Having sketched the contours of the ‘Bandung divide’ and established its heuristic utility as a shorthand for the two countries’ divergent approaches to international order and regional security, the authors then evaluate its contemporary significance as a barrier to bilateral security cooperation in relation to two key challenges: Chinese revisionism in the South China Sea and transnational jihadist terrorism. Indonesia and Australia’s divergent approaches to regional security—themselves partially legacies of the ‘Bandung divide’—have prevented meaningful bilateral collaboration in engaging the South China Sea dispute. By contrast, the two countries have built an effective and heavily institutionalised counterterrorism partnership, proving that the ‘Bandung divide’ is not an insuperable barrier to cooperation. The highly restrictive circumstances that made this success possible nevertheless caution against unduly optimistic assumptions that the two countries will be able to forge a more comprehensive security partnership in the foreseeable future.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
170698
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the link between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Duterte Administration’s appeasement policy on China. Relative to the South China Sea dispute, China uses the BRI as a means to ease and stabilize its strained relations with claimant countries like the Philippines. The BRI has enabled China to influence the Philippines in changing its policy on Chinese maritime expansion in the South China Sea. Lured by the BRI, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte is undoing his predecessor’s policy of balancing China’s expansive claim in the disputed waters. Based on his calculation, the Philippines will benefit from the BRI initiative—particularly in the revival of the maritime silk route—as it dovetails with his administration’s massive infrastructure build-up program. In conclusion, the article contends that President Duterte is convinced that his appeasement policy toward China is worth pursuing because it makes the Philippines a beneficiary of the BRI. However, 3 years into his term, he has yet to see the implementation of BRI-funded infrastructure projects, which have been delayed by technical problems, the Philippine military, and the Filipino people’s distrust of China because of the South China Sea issue in particular, and its behavior as emergent power in East Asia in general.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
160717
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Although not formal allies, China and Russia have steadily increased their strategic cooperation. However, crises and tensions in each other's areas of strategic interest continue to complicate each country's relations with the other and the rest of the international community. In this article we explore China's reaction toward major crises in the post-Soviet space (the Caucasus crisis of 2008 and the Ukraine crisis of 2014) and Russia's responses to the South China Sea dispute and show that they share many similarities. To explain the reaction patterns and better understand the nature of contemporary China-Russia relations, we apply a neoclassical realist framework, which helps assess the impact of both system-level and unit-level factors on great powers' behavior. The assessment demonstrates that the observed behavior pattern is an outcome of causal forces of different levels simultaneously pushing in different directions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
128280
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China's responses of turning its back on the compulsory arbitration initiated by the Philippines on 22 January 2013 with respect to aspects of the South China Sea dispute between them under Article 287 and Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and failing to participate in constituting the five-member Arbitral Tribunal raise issues of whether the arbitral process has or can be halted by China and whether China's nonparticipation is in its best interest. This article examines the legal effects of China's actions and China's policy options with respect to the arbitral procedure started by the Philippines.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
133901
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China's recent statement has sparked tension in the region: "We should not leave the world with the impression that China is only focused on economic development, nor should we pursue the reputation of being a peaceful power." Now, the question stands whether India's growing involvement with Vietnam or her moves in the SCS will act as a counter-move to China's activities and support in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
188430
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
When great powers such as the United States and China grow especially hawkish with more uncertainties, how does a smaller state react to such a complex and dangerous territorial conflict? Given the competing frames of influence between China and the United States, what are the underlying reasons for the shift in the Philippines’ foreign policy? This paper focuses on the Philippines’ changing foreign policy on the South China Sea dispute and examines the main rationale for its shift in strategy towards China. We use the perspective of neoclassical realism to unpack the constraining factors that underlie the Philippines’ domestic politics and ongoing global exigencies. With changes in its domestic politics and the security challenges posed by the evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines is in a difficult situation, having to choose between a territorially hostile trading partner and its historical security guarantor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
149052
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In this study I analyze Taiwan’s policy toward the South China Sea dispute. I also examine two options that Taipei may wish to consider to address the growing instability in the area. I suggest that while some minor adjustments in policy might be warranted, it appears likely that Taiwan will resist significant changes to its present policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
151187
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
160173
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2018.
|
| Description |
90p.pbk
|
| Standard Number |
9789387324381
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059440 | 327.540597/DAS 059440 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
158250
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The South China Sea has been recognized as the lifeline of economic progress of the entire Indo-Pacific region. The geo-strategically significant region, the Indo-Pacific has been turned into an arena of overlapping interests amongst the major powers for gaining their strategic leverages.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
149536
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Malaysia has traditionally adopted a “playing it safe” approach to the South China Sea designed to secure its claims while simultaneously ensuring that it preserves its important bilateral relationship with China. Ahead of the ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016, that approach had come under increasing scrutiny, given the bolder and more frequent Chinese encroachments into Malaysian waters as well as some other diplomatic incidents in the Sino-Malaysian relationship.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
188225
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates and examines the efficacy of the multilateral and bilateral modalities or mechanisms in managing the South China Sea dispute between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant states. There are three multilateral modalities in the management and control of the South China Sea dispute: the “ASEAN + China,” “ASEAN + X” and “ASEAN-X” modalities. At the bilateral level, mechanisms have developed between China and the Philippines, China and Vietnam, and China and Malaysia. It is argued in this article that the “ASEAN + China” modality remains the most realistic multilateral arrangement currently, while the alternative options of “ASEAN + X” and “ASEAN-X” might be feasible in the long term. Meanwhile, while bilateral mechanisms have fostered trust building and pragmatic maritime cooperation in the South China Sea, they are facing a number of challenges.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
143852
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
New Delhi, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd., 2016.
|
| Description |
xvi, 184p.hbk
|
| Standard Number |
9789385563478
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058487 | 551.4670468/SAK 058487 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
158233
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
As long as both China and the US believe that they have inherent right to rule over the world particularly the divine mandate to rule over Asia and other parts of the world, particularly the South China Sea, they may reasonable be considered as tending towards an inevitable showdown which, if happened, will be the worst ever in the history of human civilisation as both the likely belligerents are well equipped with latest kind of highly destructive nuclear and other lethal weapons of mass destruction.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
123573
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
186532
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article situates the Philippines-U.S. alliance within the changing U.S. grand strategies from Barrack Obama’s rebalancing to Asia to President Joe Biden’s continuance of the Trump Administration’s strategic competition with China. Upon President Obama’s announcement of the rebalancing policy in 2011, the Philippines already figured prominently in the American security agenda in Asia, particularly with the intensification of the Philippines-China territorial dispute in the South China Sea. In 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte effected a major shift in Philippine foreign policy by distancing the country from the U.S. and gravitating toward China. The Trump Administration, however, saw the Philippines as a crucial ally in its geostrategic competition with China. Consequently, Washington adopted a policy of strategic patience to bring Duterte onside the U.S. rather than pushing him to China’s embrace. This scheme stabilized the two countries’ security relations and ensured the Philippines’ commitment to the U.S. system of bilateral alliances. In conclusion, the article argues that given the Philippines’ close security ties with the U.S. that often clash with China’s strategic interests and close Philippines-China diplomatic/economic relations, it will be difficult and challenging for President Duterte to pursue an independent foreign policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|