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| 1 |
ID:
159981
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| 2 |
ID:
167890
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| 3 |
ID:
173992
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| 4 |
ID:
110872
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States has introduced automatic enrollment into retirement savings schemes, and the United Kingdom is in the throes of doing so. The financial crisis has reminded us that returns on these schemes can be poor, even negative. Behavioral economics shows that people can be "nudged" into schemes regardless, but it also implies that the liberal account of market legitimation through informed choice cannot be applied. This article examines how risks are assigned in schemes and how enrollees might seek recourse if their expectations are disappointed. Comparing the United States and the United Kingdom, it argues that enrollees are more likely to seek recourse from the government in the United Kingdom. The explanation can be found in regulatory decisions that reflect the structure of each country's public pension scheme. This structure is conducive to private risk bearing in the United States, but not in the United Kingdom, suggesting that regulatory market liberalism is undermined by a residual approach to public provision.
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| 5 |
ID:
162575
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| Summary/Abstract |
recent years have not been good to independent committees and policy advisory bodies. Last December, the entire Social Mobility Commission, headed by Alan Milburn, resigned, citing a lack of political progress towards a fairer Britain. Andrew Adonis left the National Infrastructure Commission with a tirade against political dysfunction around Brexit, as well as some specific criticisms of the government's handling of the East Coast mainline rail franchise. The Office for Budget Responsibility, once lauded as a source of objective forecasts on the public finances, has found itself the object of repeated sniping for its Brexit pessimism, as has the Governor of the Bank of England.
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| 6 |
ID:
153287
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| 7 |
ID:
135889
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| Summary/Abstract |
Before his untimely death in 2011, Peter Mair took up the idea of ‘representative and responsible government’ from Anthony Birch’s 1964 book.1 Mair argued that the contemporary political malaise of Western democracies arose from the gap between the demands of representation and the constraints of prudence, consistency and conformity to external commitments which face a responsible government. This tension is evident in immigration policy. In responding to public opinion, the government has been drawn into making promises that it cannot honour without radically rewriting the UK’s external commitments. To fend off the threat from UKIP, the government is taking the country to the brink of leaving the European Union. Yet the promise to limit immigration apparently had to be made: it was ‘demanded’ by a section of the public that would otherwise defect to the political fringe—to a party entirely occupied with representation and unimpaired by the constraints of responsibility
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| 8 |
ID:
122465
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The welfare reforms of the Coalition government are marked by the legacy of Thatcherism. Social security reforms in the 1980s reshaped the system towards reliance on means-tested benefits. Negative policy feedback created by the opacity and perverse effects of means-testing has made these benefits an easy target for the Coalition, at least so far as working age people are concerned. Different policy feedbacks affect policy towards old age pensions. The government is locked into promoting private pensions, and is extending this commitment with automatic enrolment. To make private pensions pay, it has to reverse the slide to means-testing. The implication is that the pronounced bias against the working poor and in favour of older people in Coalition policy is not simply a matter of electoral preferences: rather, it reflects the political effects of previous policy decisions.
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| 9 |
ID:
141750
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| 10 |
ID:
176067
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| Summary/Abstract |
the johnson government has no talent for avoiding responsibility for failure. The outbreak of the pandemic should have brought blame‐avoiding instincts to the fore. There were no gains in sight, only losses to be allocated: deaths and economic damage in unforgiving ratios. True, the experts were wheeled out, but they could not be asked to judge difficult trade‐offs. The insistence of the Scottish and Welsh governments on raising their voices should have provided a clue about a workable blame‐avoidance strategy: involve everyone and seek consensus.
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| 11 |
ID:
149231
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| 12 |
ID:
156771
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