| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States has introduced automatic enrollment into retirement savings schemes, and the United Kingdom is in the throes of doing so. The financial crisis has reminded us that returns on these schemes can be poor, even negative. Behavioral economics shows that people can be "nudged" into schemes regardless, but it also implies that the liberal account of market legitimation through informed choice cannot be applied. This article examines how risks are assigned in schemes and how enrollees might seek recourse if their expectations are disappointed. Comparing the United States and the United Kingdom, it argues that enrollees are more likely to seek recourse from the government in the United Kingdom. The explanation can be found in regulatory decisions that reflect the structure of each country's public pension scheme. This structure is conducive to private risk bearing in the United States, but not in the United Kingdom, suggesting that regulatory market liberalism is undermined by a residual approach to public provision.
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