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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
110898
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces four trends of China's foreign strategy. Analysis of China's diplomacy since the 1980s based on these concepts demonstrates China's intent to become a great power and its aspirations for a China-centric order.
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| 2 |
ID:
152069
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| Summary/Abstract |
The development of nuclear weapons by Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—dubbed “second-generation proliferators”—was initially opaque, in that they did not involve, inter alia, not nuclear testing. Although each of these states' nuclear programs has generally gone from secret to public knowledge, they have taken divergent paths over the years. Israel has maintained its opacity, South Africa has dismantled its weapons, and India, Pakistan, and the DPRK have shifted from opacity to visibility by conducting nuclear tests. The preference for opacity or disclosure can be explained by the balance between factors favoring opacity (norms, diplomatic pressure, and security dilemma) and those favoring disclosure (deterrence, international prestige, and domestic politics). If a new proliferator emerges, it will probably do so opaquely, rather than visibly. To prevent and deny this option, early detection, raising the diplomatic, political, and economic costs of opacity, and steadfast determination not to allow the existence of undeclared nuclear states are key. These points apply to the implementation of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Iran.
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