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| 1 |
ID:
111337
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The choice between centralized and decentralized electricity generation is examined for 150 countries as a function of population distribution, electricity consumption, transmission cost, and the cost difference between decentralized and centralized electricity generation. A network algorithm is developed to find the shortest centralized transmission network that spans a given fraction of the population in a country. The least-cost combination of centralized and decentralized electricity that serves the country is determined. Case studies of Botswana, Uganda, and Bangladesh illustrate situations that are more and less suited for decentralized electrification. Specific maps for centralized and decentralized generation are presented to show how the least-cost option varies with the relative costs of centralized and decentralized generation and transmission cost. Centralized and decentralized fractions are calculated for 150 countries. For most of the world's population, centralized electricity is the least-cost option. For a number of countries, particularly in Africa, substantial populations and regions may be most cost-effectively served by decentralized electricity.
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| 2 |
ID:
166703
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| Summary/Abstract |
We present a computationally-efficient optimization model that finds the least-cost generation unit expansion, commitment, and dispatch plan to serve hourly electricity demand and ancillary service requirements. We apply the model to a case study based on data from the electricity market in Texas (ERCOT) to analyze the market and investment impacts of several incentive mechanisms that support variable renewable energy (VRE) investments and carbon emission reductions. In contrast to many previous studies, the model determines least-cost VRE investments under different cost and incentive assumptions rather than analyzing scenarios where VRE expansion is pre-determined. We find that electricity prices can vary significantly under different incentive mechanisms, even when comparable generation portfolios result. Therefore, the preferred incentive mechanism depends on stakeholder objectives as well as the prevailing electricity market framework. Our results indicate that a carbon tax is more system cost-efficient for reducing emissions, while production and investment tax credits are more system cost-efficient for increasing VRE investments. Similarly, incentive mechanisms that reduce electricity prices may increase the need for separate revenue sufficiency mechanisms (e.g. a capacity market) more than a policy that increases electricity prices. Moreover, the impacts on consumer payments are not always aligned with changes in system costs. Overall, the analysis illustrates the importance of considering electricity market impacts in assessing the economic efficiency of VRE and carbon incentive mechanisms.
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