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TIME - INCONSISTENCY
(2)
answer(s).
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Item
1
ID:
112390
Decision processes of a suicide bomber—the economics and psychology of attacking and defecting
/ Pittel, Karen; Rubbelke, Dirk T G
Rubbelke, Dirk T G
Journal Article
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Publication
2012.
Summary/Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of suicide attacks and defection. First, decision processes of potential attackers are examined from an economist's perspective. The results are then applied to insights from behavioural economics and psychology. We derive conditions under which agents decide to become suicide bombers-or to announce an attack and defect later. Taking account of hyperbolic discounting we show why the decision to commit a suicide attack can be time-inconsistent and what internal manipulation mechanisms (arising from cognitive dissonance and terror management) and external manipulation mechanisms (employed by terrorist organizations and governments) might prevent or foster time-inconsistency.
Key Words
Suicide Terrorism
;
Hyperbolic Discounting
;
Cognitive Dissonance
;
Defection
;
Terror Management
;
Time - Inconsistency
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2
ID:
111352
Review of the role and remit of the committee on climate change
/ McGregor, Peter G; Swales, J Kim; Winning, Matthew A
McGregor, Peter G
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2012.
Summary/Abstract
Domestic action on climate change requires a combination of solutions, in terms of institutions and policy instruments. One way of achieving government carbon policy goals may be the creation of an independent body to advise on, or set, monitor policy. This paper critically assesses the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which was created in 2008 as an independent body to help move the UK towards a low-carbon economy. We look at the motivation for its creation. In particular we consider its ability to overcome a time-inconsistency problem by comparing it to another independent body, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. In practice the CCC appears to be the "inverse" of the Monetary Policy Committee, in that it advises on what the policy goal should be rather than being held responsible for achieving it. The CCC incorporates both advisory and monitoring functions to inform government and achieve a credible carbon policy over a long time frame. This is a similar framework to that adopted by Stern (2006), but the CCC operates on a continuing basis and also incorporates a unique climate change monitoring function.
Key Words
Climate Change
;
Independent Body
;
Time - Inconsistency
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