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| 1 |
ID:
125505
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of this paper is to discuss the needs for investment in electricity interconnectors in Europe by 2025. We evaluate the impact of cross-border transmission capacity on dispatch costs, curtailment needs for renewable energy sources (RES), on CO2 emissions, on hydro storage utilisation and on security of supply (in terms of energy not served). The analysis is performed with EUPowerDispatch, a minimum-cost dispatch model. For the evolution of the electricity generation portfolio and electricity consumption we use the latest Scenario Outlook and Adequacy Forecast of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The model results show that the planned additional cross-border transmission capacity between 2010 and 2025 will reduce annual dispatch costs, will have limited impact on the security of supply and will not be a significant cause of variable RES curtailment. However, in case of more RES, it will reduce dispatch costs to a larger extent and will considerably reduce RES curtailment needs, and, if demand grows at the historical rate of 2%, it will be needed to maintain the current level of security of supply. Moreover, our study shows that hydro pumping and storage and cross-border transmission are partly complementary technologies.
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| 2 |
ID:
111380
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When building a cross-border transmission line (a so-called interconnector) as a for-profit (merchant) project, where the regulator has required that capacity allocation be done non-discriminatorily by explicit auction, the identity of the investor can affect the profitability of the interconnector project and, once operational, the resulting allocation of its capacity. Specifically, when the investor is a generator (hereafter the integrated generator) who also can use the interconnector to export its electricity to a distant location, then, once operational, the integrated generator will bid more aggressively in the allocation auctions to increase the auction revenue and thus its profits. As a result, the integrated generator is more likely to win the auction and the capacity is sold for a higher price. This lowers the allocative efficiency of the auction, but it increases the expected ex-ante profitability of the merchant interconnector project. Unaffiliated, independent generators, however, are less likely to win the auction and, in any case, pay a higher price, which dramatically lowers their revenues from exporting electricity over this interconnector.
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