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| 1 |
ID:
111495
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 13 and 23 May 2010, four atmospheric radionuclide surveillance stations, in South Korea, Japan, and the Russian Federation, detected xenon and xenon daughter radionuclides in concentrations up to 10 and 0.1 mBq/m3 respectively. All these measurements were made in air masses that had passed over North Korea a few days earlier. This article shows that these radionuclide observations are consistent with a North Korean low-yield nuclear test on 11 May 2010, even though no seismic signals from such a test have been detected. Appendix 1 presents a detailed analysis of the radioxenon data and Appendix 2 describes a hypothetical nuclear test scenario consistent with this analysis, including the possibility that the test used uranium-235 rather than plutonium-239. The analysis suggests that the technical and analytical basis to detect small nuclear tests using radionuclide signatures may be more developed than is generally assumed.
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| 2 |
ID:
115974
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We have attempted to detect seismic signals from small explosions in North Korea on five specific days in 2010 that feature in scenarios proposed by De Geer. We searched the seismic data recorded by station MDJ in northeastern China, applying three-component cross-correlation methods using signals from known explosions as templates. We assess the capability of this method of detection, and of simpler methods, all of which failed to find seismic signals that would be expected if De Geer's scenarios were valid. We conclude that no well-coupled underground explosion above about a ton occurred near the North Korea test site on these five days and that any explosion would have to be very small (local magnitude less than about 2) to escape detection.
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