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SINGLE - MEMBER DISTRICTS (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   111506


Do voters reward rebellion? the electoral accountability of MPs / Vivyan, Nick; Wagner, Markus   Journal Article
Vivyan, Nick Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract To hold their Members of Parliament individually accountable for their legislative behaviour, British voters would need to base their decision to vote for an MP at least partially on the extent to which the MP's legislative voting behaviour deviated from that of the MP's party leadership. Voters should evaluate this deviation contingent on their views of the party leadership. MP rebellion can signal that voter-MP congruence is greater than that of the voter and the MP's party leadership. In this article it is found that only constituents with negative attitudes toward the Labour government reward rebellious Labour MPs, albeit to a limited extent. A similar conditional association is not observed on a single issue: Iraq. The policy accountability of MPs is relatively weak and general rather than issue-specific.
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2
ID:   126130


Examining biases in the single-member district Tier of Taiwan's / Jou, Willy   Journal Article
Jou, Willy Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Two elections to the Legislative Yuan have been held under a mixed parallel system. While there have been criticisms that this new set of rules leads to a considerable disparity between parties' vote and seat shares in the district tier, in so far as the new electoral system has been accepted and therefore treated as given by both parties and voters, its fairness should be assessed not by the degree of proportionality, but rather by examining various sources of potential bias. These include differences in electorate sizes and turnout rates across districts, and the efficiency by which votes for the main parties' candidates are distributed. The present study investigates how "fair" the functioning of Taiwan s new mixed parallel system was in the 2008 and 2012 legislative elections by simulating equal and reverse vote scenarios at the district level, and measuring the magnitude of each component of electoral bias. The results show that the operation of the electoral system entails no marked partisan bias, since it does not consistently confer an advantage to either of the main parties or camps.
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