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| 1 |
ID:
122244
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When news of Stuxnet first emerged, many thought that it had caused a major setback to Iran's uranium-enrichment programme. Ivanka Barzashka argues instead that while Stuxnet may have had the potential to seriously damage Iranian centrifuges, evidence of the worm's impact is circumstantial and inconclusive. Her analysis of the related data shows that the 2009 version of Stuxnet was neither very effective nor well-timed and, in hindsight, may have been of net benefit to Tehran.
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| 2 |
ID:
129322
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| 3 |
ID:
111589
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A comparison between Iran's current nuclear efforts and those of the pro-Western regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi shows that Iranian ambitions for a full-fledged civilian nuclear programme have remained relatively constant for nearly half a century. Today, fuel cycle technology provides Iran with a latent nuclear weapon's potential. However, US concerns about an Iranian bomb, which began in the early 1970s and aggravated after the Iranian Revolution, long predate Teheran's uranium enrichment programme. Thus, Iran is a specific case of the general problem presented by the inherent potential of nuclear technology to both civilian and military ends. Approaches to dealing with a long-term, ambiguous, latent nuclear weapon threat, whether Iranian or other, are suggested.
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