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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
167329
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| Summary/Abstract |
In looking at the case of Niger, this article demonstrates that there have been a lot of similarities between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 and its ‘going out’ strategy initiated in the late 1990s. Prior to 2013, many of the BRI’s objectives and strategies were already at work in Africa, and particularly in socioeconomically poor, landlocked countries that badly need infrastructure and connectivity. It also shows that China has been ready to invest in projects that are not necessarily profitable in the short term to consolidate its economic and diplomatic presence in the targeted country as well as to help its large state firms growing and internationalizing. It then demonstrates that although Niger did not belong in the initial group of countries targeted by the BRI, this initiative has contributed to deepening China’s economic and political influence in Niger, particularly to the detriment of France. Finally, this article highlights that both in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region, and in the BRI countries, China is facing emerging security challenges, continuing to mainly rely on others to overcome them.
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| 2 |
ID:
111811
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| 3 |
ID:
168440
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force are ad hoc counterterrorism task forces in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel region, respectively. These new task forces enjoy significant international capacity-building support, especially from France and the United States. This article shows that capacity-building actions, while fostering the operationalization of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, nevertheless have several limitations. Capacity-building counterterrorism initiatives tend to favor security-focused strategies at the expense of efforts that could tackle the structural challenges that fuel terrorism. Such actions are also likely to incentivize dysfunctional practices on the part of security forces and political regimes in recipient countries. It is imperative for major outside players to work with African countries by promoting social and economic development projects, respect for civil rights and freedoms, as well as the community engagement of security forces.
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| 4 |
ID:
140529
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Barack Obama was elected U.S. president in 2008, the news was greeted with enormous hope in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as among the small coterie of Americans who follow the region closely. This son of a Kenyan father would not only understand the continent better than his predecessors in the White House, the thinking went, but he would also treat it as a strategic priority and direct more resources its way. At the time, it didn’t seem far-fetched to predict that Obama would usher in a new era of improved U.S.-African relations. Even though President George W. Bush had substantially increased aid to Africa, anti-Americanism there had grown under his watch, the result of opposition to his unilateralist foreign policy.
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| 5 |
ID:
129325
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| 6 |
ID:
182434
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| Summary/Abstract |
Security in the Sahel region has traditionally been studied through a realist prism, emphasising military concerns and the pre-eminent influence of great powers in shaping local security concerns. The paper reviews the securitisation initiatives in Africa's Sahel. It specifically explores Buzan and Waever's ‘securitisation' framework to re-evaluate securitising discourse and the contemporary initiatives of the EU, France and the U.S.A. in the Sahelian States. Its main observation is that the central security actors in the Sahel have over the years paid less attention to the securitisation of threats in the region. The paper provides indicators of successful securitisation, which includes but goes beyond speech acts. It underscores the reality that though the securitisation of Africa's Sahel has helped to legitimise the ‘war on terrorism', it has very little to offer for Africa’s development problems. The paper posits that securitisation, though a laudable initiative, does not sufficiently address root causes of terrorism, which are not military but social and economic. It thus recommends a holistic approach to addressing the security challenges in the Sahel; which must include: providing increased safe access for those who want to work in the West while also assisting to create economic prospects and opportunities in the region.
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| 7 |
ID:
122839
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The combined force of the 2012 coup in Bamako and the rebellion in the north entailed an unmasking of Mali. What had been presented as a showcase of democracy, good governance, and peace and reconciliation proved to be a facade for institutional weakness and mismanagement. The collusion between regional and national 'big man' interests that the crisis revealed showed little if any respect for human security and development. This article will analyse the causes of the crisis and the strategies of key actors, including the Islamist rebels. The consequences of and responses to the conflict will also be addressed before the article ends with some tentative conclusions concerning the future stability of Mali and the Sahel region. The article is based on the authors' long engagement with Mali, spanning more than a decade, but the most recent material presented is based on a series of in-depth interviews conducted there in February and March 2013.
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