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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
123887
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) will be held in 2015. With unfinished business from its 2010 predecessor, and with no sign that UK national strategy is about to escape the grip of austerity, the 2015 SDSR is set to be more complex and contentious than the government might have hoped.
There is a possibility that the review will, yet again, see the three armed services struggle against each other to secure the largest slice of a diminishing cake. The review might also be captured by a fruitless discussion of 'grand strategy'. SDSR 2015 must avoid both of these distractions.
There are four principal concerns arising from SDSR 2010: the feasibility of the Future Force 2020 plan, various capability gaps that must be managed, inconsistencies in the national strategic planning framework, and unresolved concerns about the relationship between society, armed forces and government in the UK.
In response to these concerns, the authors argue for a risk-sharing approach to the SDSR, embracing the widest conceivable range of stakeholders in national strategy: the armed services, government departments and agencies, industry, civil society, and allies and partners.
In UK military circles, inter-service cooperation is known as 'jointery' and is denoted by a certain shade of purple. The effect of austerity is to constrain national strategy, just as the international security environment makes ever more demands upon it. In these circumstances, strategic options must be generated by joint collaboration, denoted by as many shades of purple as appropriate.
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| 2 |
ID:
111909
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the first steps taken by the newly elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government was to initiate a review of the national strategy of the United Kingdom. The review culminated in October 2010 in the publication of a revised National Security Strategy as well as a new Strategic Defence and Security Review. With the benefit of over twelve months of hindsight, this article is concerned with the formulation, the implementation and the longer-term implications of the 2010 strategy review. The first part of the article assesses the review as a national strategic plan. What were the strategic challenges addressed by the review, what decisions, judgements and misjudgements were made, and what was overlooked? In part two the authors turn to operational matters: how far was the UK's post-review strategic experience (i.e. in Afghanistan and Libya) consistent with the decisions and promises made in 2010? Part three discusses the review as a public statement of national policy, gauging the impression it has made on the national strategic narrative since 2010: how was the review received, what reputation has it acquired and what was/is the quality of the debate surrounding it? Finally, in part four the article asks what the 2010 review and its aftermath reveal of the formulation and implementation of national strategy in the United Kingdom. Was the 2010 review simply the latest in a long series of attempts by government to find a convincing and durable compromise between security challenges and national resources? Or was the review the beginning of something different altogether? Could UK national strategy henceforth be more of an adaptive, iterative process than a compressed period of analysis and reflection followed by the publication of a policy statement with an inevitably brief shelf-life?
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