| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article adds empirical and historical depth to the debate about security sector reform (SSR) by analysing British-led reform of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) against the backdrop of late-colonial policing reforms. It argues that the security-development logic that frames SSR skates gingerly over a difficult problem familiar from the late-colonial period: that of investing sufficient coercive capacity in the state for it to withstand threats without simultaneously making it more effective at oppression. Whereas colonial discourse balanced the goal of introducing a civilian order against relatively specific advice on how to organize and use force in emergencies, the security-development discourse offers little guidance as to the type and level of force the police should be equipped with in the service of development. The supply of more than £1m worth of weapons and munitions to the SLP illustrates the inherent dilemma of SSR in weak states, and by strengthening the coercive capacity of the state it may ultimately jeopardize the success of police reform in Sierra Leone.
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