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| 1 |
ID:
154714
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| Summary/Abstract |
The UN Charter describes him or her merely as the “chief administrative officer of the organization,” yet today the Secretary-General is widely recognized as the UN's chief political representative. How did this transformation and expansion of the office from administrative to political take place? Existing scholarship tends to emphasize the contribution made by Dag Hammarskjöld. This article challenges that story on two accounts: first, by pointing out the importance of institutional factors and not just the officeholder's personality; and second, by examining the contribution made by Trygve Lie, the UN's first Secretary-General. The article establishes a conceptual framework based on institutional theory to understand the role of the Secretary-General and analyzes Lie's contribution in the period 1946–1953.
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| 2 |
ID:
124389
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when actors have heterogeneous preferences over the desirability of the action and split into supporters and opponents, all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome. We study how actors can communicate their preferences through voting when they are not bound either by their own vote or the outcome of the collective vote. We identify two organizational types with endogenous coercive enforcement and find that neither is unambiguously preferable. Like the solutions to the traditional Prisoners' Dilemma these forms require long shadows of the future to sustain. We then show that cooperation can be sustained through a noncoercive organization where actors delegate execution to an agent. Even though this institution is costlier, it does not require any expertise by the agent and is independent of the shadow of the future, and thus is implementable when the others are not
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| 3 |
ID:
124429
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its initial formulation in science and technology studies, actor-network theory (ANT) has spread like wildfire throughout the social sciences. Wildfires are fueled by dry and flammable vegetation as well as hot, gusting winds. ANT finds flammable vegetation among those frustrated with many of the conventions, dualisms, and dilemmas of the traditional social sciences. ANT promises to liberate scholars from strict dualisms such as the nature/society divide and the agency/structure dilemma. It claims to open up a reflexive discourse on what constitutes the practice of science. ANT's avant-garde spirit further fuels the fire. Others reject ANT. They (rightfully) lament the often-awkward terminology of ANT, its lack of appropriately defined models and concepts, its literary style of presentation, as well as the radical rhetoric that often comes along with it. For many, the question of what actually constitutes ANT remains mysterious, and it is often unclear whether it is more than a "new materialist" argument for taking objects, things, and technology seriously.
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| 4 |
ID:
124837
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The relationship between Afghanistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a relatively new area of research. This article discusses the interplay between Afghanistan, China and the SCO vis -vis the Bonn 2001 to Bonn 2011 conference. Afghanistan was granted observer status in 2012 in order to facilitate its integration in the wider region and lessen US- NATO influence in the country.
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| 5 |
ID:
078948
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent donor discourse points to the potential of faith-based organisations (fbos) as 'agents of transformation', mobilising the moral energy of faith communities in support of the Millennium Developments Goals (mdgs). This new donor-driven agenda, however, invites scrutiny of complementary processes of organisational change within donor institutions. This article therefore examines donor policy and practice concerned with engagement with fbos. While considering the work of a number of donors, it focuses on the UK Department for International Development (dfid) and traces the reasons for dfid's growing interest in fbos from 1997. It examines the challenges which dfid faces in further developing this engagement and considers whether it and others donors can themselves become 'agents of transformation', embracing a less material and less secular vision of well-being and a more culturally inclusive approach to partnership. In contrast to recent scholarship, which presents a benign view of the emerging 'faith and development' interface, this article considers it as a controversial new Zeitgeist in development policy and discourse.
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| 6 |
ID:
080890
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In International Relations applications, theorists employing Principal- Agent (P-A) theory have posited that the fact of delegation defines a relationship between states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) where recontracting threats are the predominant way states influence IOs. Developing a category of delegation to international Trustees, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less effective at influencing the Trustees. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary. These three factors account for the different politics between Principals and Trustees, a politics aimed at either keeping issues outside of the domain of the Trustee or at rhetorically engaging the Trustee's authority in an effort to persuade the common `beneficiary' whose loyalty and respect both States and the Trustee seek. In explaining why recontracting threats are not central to Principal-Trustee relations, the analysis bounds the realm in which we might expect P-A theory to apply, and provides a theoretical basis to question the `rational expectations' claim that ICs are tailoring their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontracting
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| 7 |
ID:
155536
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| Summary/Abstract |
International organizations have repeatedly deceived donors to secure ever more funding for AIDS-relief efforts. Ross Benes discusses the incentives for biomedical companies and groups like UNAIDS to mislead the public, while cheaper, more effective solutions remain underfunded.
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| 8 |
ID:
031900
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| Publication |
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
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| Description |
xii, 132p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 005944 | 358.40073/SMI 005944 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
024379
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| Publication |
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967.
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| Description |
118p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 002504 | 327.73/LER 002504 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
127311
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2014.
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Americans still believe their country is unique but are less convinced it has a special responsibility to lead. This has both domestic and international implications.
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| 11 |
ID:
073474
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Hampshire, Plagrave macmillan, 2006.
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| Description |
ix, 234p.
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| Standard Number |
140398963X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051573 | 327.1/LIT 051573 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
032700
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Chicago, University Chicago Press, 1977.
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| Description |
xvi, 315p.
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| Standard Number |
0226043606
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 019284 | 327.174/BER 019284 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
055350
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| 14 |
ID:
169544
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Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2019.
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| Description |
xi, 244p.: ill.,hbk
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| Standard Number |
9781501740244
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059771 | 327.1/POA 059771 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
130322
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the widening confrontation over the political future of the Crimean peninsula and other parts of the former Soviet Union has ruptured already-strained relations between Moscow and the West and put at risk the implementation of some nuclear risk-reduction initiatives and agreements, Russia is not planning to stop allowing the on-site inspections required under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), Russian officials said last month. To protest Russia's actions to take control of Crimea, the seven non-Russian members of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries have suspended Russia's membership in the group. As part of that decision, the seven countries-Canada, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States-changed the location of their planned June summit from Sochi to Brussels. The Russian actions in Crimea have disrupted planning for the activities of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which the G-8 launched in 2002.
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| 16 |
ID:
130356
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Global Nuclear Disarmament and risk reduction enterprise is at a crossroads as U.S.-Russian relations have reached perhaps their lowest point in more than a quarter century. Nevertheless, it remains in U.S. and Russian interests to implement existing nuclear risk reduction agreements and pursue practical, low-risk steps to lower tensions. Present circumstances demand new approaches to resolve stubborn challenges to deeper nuclear cuts and the establishment of a new framework to address Euro-Atlantic security issues.
Even before the recent political turmoil in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin's extralegal occupation and annexation of Crimea, relations between Moscow and Washington were chilly. Despite U.S. adjustments to its missile defense plans in Europe that eliminate any threat to Russian strategic missiles, Putin rebuffed U.S. President Barack Obama's proposal last June to reduce U.S. and Russian strategic stockpiles by one-third below the ceilings set by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
Moving forward will be difficult, but doing nothing is not an option. Through earlier crises during and after the Cold War, U.S. and Russian leaders pursued effective arms control and disarmament initiatives that increased mutual security and significantly reduced the nuclear danger. Much has been achieved, albeit too slowly, but there is far more to be done.
As the world's non-nuclear-weapon states persuasively argue, U.S. and Russian stockpiles still far exceed any plausible deterrence requirements, and the use of just a few nuclear weapons by any country would have catastrophic global consequences. As the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference approaches, pressure to accelerate action on disarmament will only grow.
For now, neither Russia nor the United States wants to scrap the existing arms control regime, including New START and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which provide greater predictability and stability in an otherwise strained bilateral relationship. A return to a period of unconstrained strategic nuclear competition would not only deepen the distrust and increase dangers for both sides, but also would undermine the NPT. Scrapping the existing nuclear risk reduction measures would do nothing to protect Ukraine from further Russian aggression or reassure nervous NATO allies.
Unfortunately, the profound tensions over Ukraine delay the possibility of any formal, bilateral talks on nuclear arms reductions and missile defense. In light of these realities, Obama and other key leaders must explore alternative options to reduce global nuclear dangers and defuse U.S.-Russian strategic tensions.
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| 17 |
ID:
006448
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| Publication |
London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990.
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| Description |
xv, 265p.
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| Standard Number |
0333497201
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 037625 | 341.2473/BRO 037625 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
041736
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Indian School of international Studies, 1967.
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| Description |
6p.
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| Series |
working paper no.; 7
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 001265 | 327.17/BAX 001265 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
126676
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay describes the piracy that took place in the Mediterranean from the time of ancient Greece to Barbary. It explains the corso, the sea war between nonstate but state-endorsed Christian and Muslim parties, with reference to the Knights of Malta and, more extensively, the Barbary corsairs. Although the essay focuses primarily on history, it also draws some conclusions about piracy and the international system today. The essay notes a prevailing assumption that contemporary piracy off Somalia and that perpetrated by the Barbary pirates is similar, but it further notes that any similarities are slight and superficial. At the same time, similarities rooted in economic, social, and political change do exist between all outbreaks of depredation at sea and the responses to them.
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| 20 |
ID:
099818
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article draws on principal-agent theories in the international organization literature and postagreement negotiation analysis in the negotiation literature to examine a case of international development negotiations among parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. The role of the "collective principal" - the negotiating body of state actors that creates an international organization - is described and the analysis examines subsequent negotiations when the parties, as principal, do not coalesce into a collective actor regarding the mandate for the organization - or agent - they created. The article suggests that postagreement negotiation analysis provides an understanding of the vehicle through which the "principal" provides "collective" oversight of the agent, and examines what we label the "regime interpretation" negotiations involved with this case.
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