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| 1 |
ID:
167187
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite repeated claims during the past century that the international legal order has been radically transformed, the contours of that order are in many ways the same in 2019 as they were in 1919. New laws govern international institutions, human rights, trade, and the environment and new institutions have emerged that affect how international law is interpreted and applied. War has lost legitimacy as a tool of foreign policy and individual responsibility for aggression and crimes against humanity has been affirmed. Yet these changes build on ideas and practices that may have been rudimentary but were not absent a century ago. Underlying them are persistent differences involving a shifting cast of old and new states as well as differences between local and universal ideals and between instrumental and noninstrumental conceptions of law. The traditional understanding of state sovereignty on which the international legal order rests has been qualified but not discarded, and its persistence confirms that the system it orders remains a system of states.
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| 2 |
ID:
112421
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Interdisciplinary approaches often bemoan international law's lack of theoretical sophistication and naïve utopianism. Instead of offering effective tools of governance, it seems committed to outdated ideas about an international public realm and a dubious teleology of progress. This essay - given as the E. H. Carr lecture at the University of Aberystwyth in 2011 - reviews efforts to reform international law into a science and a more efficient instrument of international rule. Such efforts have been a part of international law's internal development but their lack of success depends on a mistaken view of the field as a 'discipline' - a set of theoretical or technical propositions. This essay defends a view of international law as an argumentative practice in which political claims are defended and attacked, rather than as a governance tool or institutional blueprint. At its worst, law may buttress bureaucratic privilege. At its best it may offer, for a cynical world, a vocabulary for imagining better futures. It may also sharpen political thought and strategic awareness, but it cannot replace them.
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