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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
137218
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can we account for the targeted pattern of violence in Xinjiang, in which Uyghur secessionist groups attack some second-order minorities such as the Han Chinese and the Hui, but not the sizeable populations of Kazak, Kyrgyz, and Mongol minorities? Based on a variety of primary and secondary sources, I argue that members of the Han minority, being the national majority in China but a ‘nested minority’ in Xinjiang, are doomed to become a primary target of secessionist attacks as they represent, in and of themselves, the state from which Uyghur nationalists are trying to secede. Han Chinese’s – and to a lesser extent the Hui’s – economic and political dominance over the Uyghurs, along with their lack of historical ties to Xinjiang, also motivates their targeting while reinforcing the bond between other indigenous and comparatively disadvantaged minorities.
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| 2 |
ID:
112440
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many scholars have examined how human capital, geography, etc. have shaped patterns of ethnic inequality in China. This paper studies the role the state plays in producing inter-group disparities in China. It discusses the link between the state and minority threat and explains how the linkage produces ethnic variation in entry into the Chinese Communist Party. Data are drawn from two surveys (N = 3,619) on Han Chinese, Hui, and Uyghurs conducted in two Chinese cities in 2001. Controlling for background characteristics removes the Han-Uyghur difference in CCP membership attainment. In contrast, no similar patterns are found when Han Chinese are compared with Hui. This contrast is explained with reference to state reaction to ethnic variation in perceived group threat.
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| 3 |
ID:
173179
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese Communist Party stresses the regime’s role in presiding over the unity of China’s minzu (ethnic groups) and their shared stake in China’s prosperity. However, an examination of the quality of interactions between Han and ethnic minorities illustrates the regime’s vulnerability to counterclaims based on these lived experiences. This paper conducts a case study of Han–Hui relations to argue that physical separation between Han and Hui prevents the two groups from interacting in ways that transmit substantive knowledge about the differences between the groups. Instead, interactions perpetuate stereotypes and distrust. By continuing to push narratives about the unity of all groups and shared family relations, the state highlights the shortcomings of its own policies, and undercuts its own legitimating narrative.
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| 4 |
ID:
191783
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, propaganda authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China have orchestrated the production of posters, banners, books, news reports, and literary magazines calling for the Sinicisation of Islam. What role is played by local Hui (Chinese Muslim) writers in the production of this propaganda? This article is based on a close reading of propaganda literature from a local county between 2010 and 2017. I show that Hui writers bargain for the preservation Hui ideological and cultural particularities. While contributing to the propaganda apparatus, they bargain to find a balance between the national call for the Sinicisation of religion and their own goal of the preservation of a Hui identity distinct from Han-Chinese culture. They argue that Sinicisation in the sense of value integration benefits the propaganda goals of the Chinese Party-State in a way that is not possible with Sinicisation in the sense of cultural and ideological assimilation.
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| 5 |
ID:
146518
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper, we examine the role played by religion in a struggle waged by Hui Muslim villagers against land expropriation. Religion can provide powerful resources for protest movements, especially for religious minorities, but it can also be dangerous. This is particularly true in China where the state has had little toleration of autonomous organization and has long been suspicious of religious organization, especially among ethnic minorities. Scholarly literature about collective action by religious minorities in China has focused on protests about cultural and political issues – and the repression of such protests – but there has been relatively little scholarship about protests by religious minorities over economic issues. The number of protests over economic conflicts has increased in recent years, and the state has been more tolerant of economic than of political protests. These conditions have shaped the following questions: what happens when villagers employ religious ideas and use religious organization to advance economic demands? How effective are religious ideas and organization as tools of mobilization? How do government authorities respond?
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| 6 |
ID:
115820
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The objective of this article is to look beneath the regional history of Xinjiang itself and examine the way in which, from the late Qing to the contemporary era, the state has recorded (and arguably failed to record) the local history of Sino-Muslim communities in Xinjiang. It will focus on the shifting relationship that the state has had with both the Sino-Muslims and the region itself, but also the political trends that have so constrained the telling of a local history that encompasses their experiences. At issue here is not whether the Sino-Muslims should be regarded as a distinct nationality or ethnic group, nor their claim to be 'local' (bendi ren), but rather the way in which this particular community, or indeed communities, have been reflected and recorded in the state's evolving narrative of the history of modern Xinjiang.
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