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| 1 |
ID:
112453
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Israel's experience with deterrence is unique: it is older, more diverse, and more experimental than that of any other state. How did Israel's strategy of deterrence evolve? How was it adapted to fit the non-state threat? And what is its utility? This article argues that Israel's experience with deterrence beyond the state can best be understood through the conceptual lenses provided by the other grand deterrence debate, that in the philosophy of law, not international relations. Israel's use of military force against non-state enemies does not fit the classic concepts of strategy. It is not just one act of force to compel one actor to fulfil one specific political goal at one given time; deterrence consists of a series of acts of force to create - and maintain - general norms of behaviour for many political actors over an extended period of time. Using force, consequently, does not represent a principal failure of deterrence but its maintenance through swift, certain, but measured responses. The inquiry concludes by identifying the method's limitations.
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| 2 |
ID:
160707
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many intelligence services around the world maintain mechanisms intended to help minimize the risk of erroneous intelligence assessments. One of the best-known mechanisms is the ‘devil’s advocate’ whose goal is to present – sometimes artificially – an intelligence assessment that contradicts the prevailing view. The goal of this practice is to try to encourage doubts, both among intelligence assessors and among decision-makers. This paper will describe the importance and function of the 'devil’s advocate' mechanism in intelligence. Using Israel as a test case, the paper will seek to draw conclusions regarding the desirable format of operations of this mechanism.
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| 3 |
ID:
126243
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the past decade, the 2001 anthrax incident in the U.S. and the 2003 SARS epidemic have highlighted the biological threat to civilian populations. The risk posed by the natural or manmade spread of biological agents among the population dictates a need for better national preparedness. One key component of this preparation is the establishment of a Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) of pharmaceuticals that would provide appropriate medical countermeasures in case of an outbreak. However, to reduce the expense of such a stockpile and to make it worthwhile, there is also a need for a shelf-life extension program (SLEP) through which pharmaceuticals could be extended beyond manufacturer-ascribed shelf life, as long as they meet regulation standards. In this article, we review the Israeli experience with the national ciprofloxacin stockpile procurement and shelf-life extension program.
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