| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
112486
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration touts the reset policy with Russia as one of its signal achievements in foreign policy. One of the key elements of its argument is Russia's help with Iran. Upon closer inspection it appears, however, that this support is tenuous and limited. Indeed, we may have reached the end of the line in terms of Russian support for the United States regarding Iranian proliferation of nuclear weapons. Though Russia clearly opposes Iranian nuclearization, it does not regard this as nearly as great a threat as does the United States, and the evidence is quite compelling that Russia sees Iran as a partner against the United States and that the US concessions made to Russia to elicit support against Iran appear to have been excessive.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
116297
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
If the international community cannot dissuade Iran from becoming either a nuclear threshold country or an explicit nuclear power, then the manner in which deterrence is extended is of utmost importance to Turkish security. Turkish security will ultimately be damaged by Iranian attempts to acquire a nuclear bomb. The credibility of extended deterrence will surely be the key factor in averting regional decisions to opt for nuclear status in the face of a likely threshold nuclear Tehran. Current proposals regarding missile defence and precision guided weapons as optimum tools of deterrence fall short as alternatives compared with a credible reliable nuclear deterrence. So as long as NATO maintains a credible mix of nuclear and conventional means of deterrence, and guarantees allied security via strengthened extended assurance, Turkey will be comfortable when confronted with new nuclear states in its region. Ankara's likely response is expected to favour strengthening security relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and seeking to bolster the American/NATO security guarantee, rather than decoupling from the alliance. As long as American/NATO extended deterrence is adapted to the new conditions and continuity is assured, a Turkish decision to decouple from the Western alliance or opt for its own individual nuclear capability remains only a distant possibility.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|