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ID:
139376
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Summary/Abstract |
Norman Angell and Alfred Thayer Mahan were two of the leading thinkers on pre–World War I “interdependence,” offering competing lessons on the changes in technology, economics, and security. At different times during the twentieth century, each one’s ideas seemed to best explain global politics and strategy. This essay reconsiders their ideas in the current era of globalization and global threats.
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2 |
ID:
112792
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article provides a broad overview of the fluctuating connections between the controversial and ambiguous field of modern geopolitics and Russia. Given the pivotal significance of the Russian challenge within the early hypotheses of Mahan and Mackinder, the article first explores those distinctive geographical and spatial considerations that helped shape the development of the Russian Empire. The place of geopolitics in the Cold War is then reviewed, including both its policy orientation and the exchanges between the proponents of geopolitical realism and liberal internationalism. In conclusion, the article examines the post-Cold War renaissance of geopolitics, reviewing both theoretical developments and policy implications for Russian foreign policy.
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3 |
ID:
176342
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Summary/Abstract |
When considering commerce interdiction as a strategy of war, Corbett’s simplicity may be attractive, but Mahan’s understanding of the globalized economy is what will win.
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4 |
ID:
130352
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5 |
ID:
181703
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Summary/Abstract |
The article argues that India and China, in their quest for maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean, are adopting the seminal ideas and strategies propounded by the celebrated naval strategist and historian, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. It analyses the reasons behind India and China’s adoption of the Mahanian naval doctrine and their increasing outreach towards the Indian Ocean region. The article also delves into the implications of following aggressive naval strategies by the two states as well as the discrepancies involved in their respective naval strategies. It concludes by arguing that although the two states are unlikely to engage in a naval war with each other in the foreseeable future, occasional flare-up in hostility and confrontation, as witnessed recently on the land border region of Ladakh, cannot be ruled out as their interests begin to affect each other more in future.
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