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ID:
179167
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| Summary/Abstract |
Every four years, the world watches intently as the democratic spectacle that is an American presidential election plays out. It is not surprising. Despite a relative decline in its global standing, the United States remains the single most powerful and influential nation on Earth. The selection of its national leader matters well beyond its shores.
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| 2 |
ID:
176433
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN 1853, American diplomats appeared in suits rather than court uniforms at a reception in Berlin. Their perplexed Prussian counterparts asked why they were dressed in black like undertakers. “We could not,” one American official quipped, “be more appropriately dressed than we are, at European courts, where what we represent is the burial of monarchy.”
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| 3 |
ID:
181574
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| Summary/Abstract |
JOE BIDEN launched his presidency with a bold message: America is back. The rank amateurs who had made such a mess of foreign policy under President Donald Trump would be replaced by responsible and experienced “adults” who understood how the world works and how to get things done. Americans and their allies abroad could rest assured that a competent corps—pedigreed experts that an earlier generation had dubbed the best and the brightest—was once again manning the U.S. ship of state. Our adversaries, we were told, would have to reckon with the return of strong American leadership to the global arena. And so on.
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| 4 |
ID:
188450
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| Summary/Abstract |
The recalibration of Saudi foreign policy under Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) reflects Riyadh’s changing assessment of its relationship with the United States and its ambition to become a full-fledged geo-economic power that is less constrained by the traditional pillars of Saudi statecraft. While much attention is being paid to the acrimonious relationship between MbS and US President Joe Biden, there are structural reasons for the growing divergence between the two countries. The October 2022 OPEC+ crisis over Saudi Arabia’s oil-production cut illustrates how Riyadh is willing to prioritise its financial and energy interests even at the risk of upsetting its long-time security partner.
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| 5 |
ID:
186922
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| 6 |
ID:
112817
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| Publication |
2012.
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THE LAW ALLOWING the U.S. President to severely limit Iran's oil exports has sparked a flurry of comments and a strong reaction from Iran. But then the anti-Iranian rhetoric abated and conciliatory notes were heard on both sides. This of course does not change the essence of the matter, nor does it remove the main question from the global agenda: Will the U.S. go to war with Iran and if so, when?
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| 7 |
ID:
176058
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| Summary/Abstract |
While Europe has moved on from waiting for the United States, President-elect Biden has the opportunity to shape a more mature and balanced relationship.
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| 8 |
ID:
188805
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are numerous material differences between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Ukraine conflict, and any comparison must be cautious. The international system is now multipolar, which makes the current conflict more complex and more global, but also potentially more tractable. The theory of nuclear deterrence has also become far more refined, and deterrence itself presumptively more stable. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in a very short time span, while the current conflict in Ukraine has been ongoing for one year and counting. One prominent similarity between the two crises is mutual miscalculation. In addition, both crises involve a risk-courting personalist dictator. Furthermore, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to flirt with nuclear brinkmanship, much like Nikita Khrushchev’s in 1962, raises the question of his rationality. The paramount lesson for the Ukraine crisis from the Cuban one may be the necessity of dialogue.
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| 9 |
ID:
187139
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article explains how Japan's strategic interests are converging with India against an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific. Japan has been pursuing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) policy, which seeks to manage China's rise by deepening Japan's strategic coordination and cooperation with its closest partners through the Quad. Though Japan still values its bilateral relationship with the United States (US), its security partnership with India is part of Tokyo's persistent efforts to support the US-led rules-based international order. In order to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has been a strong supporter among the Quad to promote non-military cooperation, primarily focusing on infrastructure building, supply chain resilience and technological innovations. The article argues that Japan's strategic engagement with India is now an integral part of its wider national security posture as Tokyo has come to recognise New Delhi as an important balancer against Beijing. That the US has enhanced its ties with India in recent years has further facilitated Japan–India strategic convergence since it is aligned with American policy towards the Indo-Pacific region in an era of great power competition.
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| 10 |
ID:
189147
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| Summary/Abstract |
A YEAR has passed since the inauguration of US President Joseph Biden from the Democratic Party, but debates over the previous American president's military-political strategy, foreign policy, and diplomacy have lost none of their relevance.
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| 11 |
ID:
186886
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