Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
112933
|
|
|
Publication |
2012.
|
Summary/Abstract |
Increasing international biomass trade for energy and concerns about sustainability of globally traded biomass have raised interest in assessments of cross-border trade related to bioenergy. Within this paper, approaches to overcome methodological difficulties related to biomass trade are proposed and applied for the case of Austria.
Biomass currently has a share of 15.5% in Austria's primary energy consumption of 1354 PJ (2009). According to energy statistics, the rate of self-sufficiency with biomass for energy (defined as the ratio of domestic production to inland consumption, with both imports and exports taken into account) is 91%. However, feedstock imports for transport fuel production and indirect imports of wood-based fuels (wood processing residues and waste liquor of the paper industry originating from imported wood) are not taken into account in energy statistics, but prove to be of some significance. Imports of agricultural commodities to the amount of 9.7 PJ can be attributed to domestic biofuel production, and indirect imports of wood-based fuels, account for 31 PJ. With these import streams taken into account, the share of domestic fuels in bioenergy use is only 67%, rather than 84%, as official energy statistics suggest. On the other hand, Austria is exporting more than 50% of its production of sawnwood, panelboard and paper products.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
ID:
145698
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
This article applies recent advances in network analysis to highlight a central tension faced by policymakers – balancing the benefits of engaging with the international system and the associated domestic policy costs. International trade rewards certain domestic practices, such as respect for human rights. Enforcing such practices, however, is politically costly and sometimes prohibitive to state leaders who rely on political repression to stay in power. In such cases, domestic elites often resort to an alternative strategy of securing the benefits of international trade – setting up indirect trade channels through intermediary states. These competing incentives are modeled within a single framework using a formal network game in which states form trade-links (direct or indirect) with other states, while simultaneously choosing their optimal level of domestic human rights protections. The model suggests that there may be an inverse relationship between a state’s embeddedness within a network of indirect trade and respect for human rights: indirect trade channels serve as loopholes that allow domestically troubled states to enjoy the benefits of trade without pressure for domestic improvement. The predictions are supported by the results of the empirical analyses of the international trade and repression data (1987–2000), conducted using a coevolutionary actor-oriented longitudinal-network model – a statistical estimator that closely mimics the theoretical model.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|