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| 1 |
ID:
150935
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| 2 |
ID:
150700
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| 3 |
ID:
113114
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From the recipients' perspective, arms transfers have, through the use of offsets, technology transfers, and industrial participation, become an opportunity to receive not only advanced weapons, but also technologies not otherwise available. How important are friendly relations for securing a military export order? To what extent do buyers demand advanced military or commercial technology and how are these demands accepted by the supplier? How does this influence smaller producers in relation to major producers? These questions are addressed by studying (a) the Joint Strike Fighter/F-35 by Lockheed Martin, USA, and the JAS-39 Gripen aircraft by Saab, Sweden, (b) the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition in India for 126 combat aircraft, and (c) the Indian offset policy. In the final section, some long-term consequences are discussed.
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| 4 |
ID:
121244
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the spring of 1975 Norway and Denmark were faced with the choice
of how to replace their aging fleets of fighter jets. Together with Belgium
and the Netherlands, the two Nordic countries had established a "buyers'
consortium" to ensure NATO standardization and a strong bargaining
position vis-à-vis the potential suppliers; hence Copenhagen and Oslo
were in very similar situations. As the final decision was about to be made,
three candidate planes were still in the competition: the American F-16, the
Swedish Saab Viggen, and the French Dassault Mirage. After a drawn-out
and exceedingly complex decision-making process, the four European NATO
members together opted for the American contender. Surely, the Danish
and Norwegian decision to procure the F-16 had several reasons behind it-
importantly, most policymakers in both Copenhagen and Oslo considered
the American aircraft to be technically superior to its competitors-but
the choice of the F-16 was in no small part motivated by old-fashioned realpolitik. The purchase of new fighter jets was thus not only perceived as a
procurement of new military equipment but also an investment in alliances
and the transatlantic link. Accordingly, Norway and Denmark chose the
American F-16 partly because this aircraft was thought to bring the greatest
strategic benefits.1
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| 5 |
ID:
155993
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| 6 |
ID:
121242
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the late 1990s the Dutch government under Labour minister-president
Wim Kok decided to pursue a replacement for the main strike fighter of the
Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNAF), the F-16. From very early on, there
was a strong preference for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This position
has held through the subsequent seven governing coalitions, even though
the political balance on the issue has fluctuated over time. Politicians have
presented the decision to participate in the JSF development program as an
entirely separate issue from that of replacing the F-16. Every government
since 1996 has insisted in public that the one issue does not necessarily lead
to the other, even though this has become an increasingly untenable division
to maintain.
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| 7 |
ID:
147350
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| Summary/Abstract |
The last official update from the defence ministry on the French Rafale aircraft categorically stated that the negotiations - the inter-governmental agreement and the offset contracts - are ‘yet to be finalised’. The details such as transfer of technology through offsets will emerge only after these negotiations are completed, defence minister Manohar Parrikar said in the Parliament on July 19. The Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) manufactured by Dassault will have advanced features like Advanced Electronic Scanned Array (AESA) radar, mid-air refuelling and advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment as a part of its design. It is still unclear which of these following technologies will be shared with the Indian private companies.
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