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1 |
ID:
176718
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Summary/Abstract |
The article analyses individual stances of the Visegrad Group countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) towards infrastructural projects in the natural gas sector currently being built by Gazprom, and determining factors influencing their respective attitudes. More specifically, the research focused on Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, pipelines that aim at supplying Europe while circumventing traditional transit countries in the central and Eastern Europe, including the Visegrad group countries. The paper is organized as a series of individual case studies, each dedicated to one state under scrutiny. The author concluded that there is no common ground upon which a unified stance of the Visegrad Group could be formulated in this regard. Also, the states differ in adherence to theoretical attitudes to energy policy in general. Despite the declared unity, the Visegrad Group states pursue their own goals determined by economic interests or long-standing foreign policy stance. Consequently, central Europe is fragmented in its attitude towards the Russian infrastructural projects and thus more prone to penetration and individualized deals.
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2 |
ID:
017576
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Publication |
Sept 2000.
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Description |
16-20
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3 |
ID:
091780
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article describes in detail the gasfields of East Siberia and the Russian Far East. In analyzing the prospects for their development, the author compares different concepts and introduces the reader to the positions of academics from the Siberian Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The development of gas deposits for the gasification of the region and for export is deemed a prerequisite for solving the problems of eastern Russia's socio-economic development.
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4 |
ID:
149973
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper discusses and contrasts the proposals for an Energy Union in the European Union and its impact on security-of-gas-supply. Based on an examination of historical East-West gas trade and by revisiting energy security concepts, the paper analyzes how problems with dependency on energy imports can be reduced. The paper discusses how the positions of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), where security challenges are especially evident, and the positions of countries in Western Europe, where they are less acute, interact and conflicts in making a common energy security policy as part of the Energy Union. The paper argues that the mainly confederative structure of the EU, and diverging national situations, make it difficult to unify positions into an effective common energy policy. However, with the CEEC in the EU, the EU is also changing, and an increased focus on energy security may be accepted. Extended interconnectedness within and to the CEEC appears to be the central issue that would mitigate, albeit not solve, contemporary security-of-gas-supply problems. As it would also bring the internal energy market closer to reality, it could in addition help the Energy Union to become a unifying project merging the interests in the East and the West despite their different security-of-gas supply concerns with Russian gas.
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5 |
ID:
192955
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Summary/Abstract |
Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players.
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6 |
ID:
089966
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
Question one about whether Gazprom is a reliable partner seems to me easier to answer, so I'll start with it. Let's compare the results of two recent polls. One was carried out in January-February 2008 for the British Financial Times by Harris Service in Western Europe and the USA. The other one was conducted by the organizers of the FLAME conference in Amsterdam on March 4, 2008 among 700 heads of European energy companies. These polls produced diametrically opposite results
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7 |
ID:
074840
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8 |
ID:
149729
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Summary/Abstract |
RUSSIAN GAS sold abroad has always competed with pipeline and liquefied commodities from other suppliers. The United States announces that liquefied natural gas (LNG) will soon be exported on a large scale not only to Asia, but also to Europe. Having launched a few major LNG projects, Australia is planning in the short term to enter international markets with considerable volumes of energy products, depriving Qatar of its leadership, which it has been holding for several years among some twenty LNG exporters.
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9 |
ID:
125560
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The non-Gazprom gas producers (NGPs) doubled their share of the Russian domestic gas market between 2000 and 2010 and have continued growing since then. For several years especially Novatek expanded. More recently, Rosneft has emerged as a key player, not least through its purchase of TNK-BP. This article begins with an overview of the companies in the Russian gas sector, their resource bases and capacities, and subsequently examines whether differences in field development costs and export market access may make it rational for Gazprom to continue ceding market share to the NGPs. With rising costs of Gazprom's queue of greenfield developments, any delays in Gazprom's investment program may be compensated through increased NGP production. The article argues that the NGPs are ready to fill the gap, may be allowed to do so and are already increasing their market share in an increasingly competitive market. The stage may now be set for a continued gradual transformation of the Russian gas market, in which the interests of Gazprom and the NGPs may be complementary or may be pitted against each other, but those of the Russian Federation are in any case likely to be better fulfilled than in the past.
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10 |
ID:
091575
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyzes the potential for Russian gas export growth through the next decade and concludes that supply for exports will continue to grow, albeit moderately. The greater or lesser intensity of that growth will depend on the evolution of both production and internal consumption. From the production side, the pace of growth depends on the status of gas reserves and, more importantly, on the investment program pursued by the State-owned gas giant Gazprom. From the demand side, evolution depends on the way Russia's wide potential for gas savings is managed. Through this analysis, we find three likely scenarios for Russian gas exports. In the most positive, diversification of exports will be possible. In the most negative, Russia will have scant opportunity to develop an export diversification strategy.
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11 |
ID:
143730
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Summary/Abstract |
LATELY, experts are discussing with increased interest whether the globalization of hydrocarbon trade, competition between Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and the Western political and economic sanctions against Russia affect the latter's competitiveness in international natural gas business.
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