Search Result

Srl

Item

ID: 113308

Dissent in Iberia: the ideal points of justices on the Spanish and Portuguese constitutional tribunals / Hanretty, Chris

Hanretty, Chris	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Publication

2012.

Summary/Abstract

In this article, the non-unanimous decisions of the Portuguese and Spanish Constitutional Tribunals for the periods 1989-2009 and 2000-2009 are analysed. It is shown that judicial dissent can be predicted moderately well on the basis of judicial ideal points along a single dimension. This dimension is equivalent to the left-right cleavage in both Portugal and Spain. The characteristics of the recovered dimension are demonstrated by analysing both the properties of the cases and the properties of the justices who decided them.

Key Words

Portugal ; Spain ; Judicial Behaviour ; Constitutional Courts

In Basket

Export

ID: 140437

Judicial disagreement need not be political: dissent on the Estonian supreme court / Hanretty, Chris

Hanretty, Chris	Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

I investigate the non-unanimous decisions of judges on the Estonian Supreme Court. I argue that since judges on the court enjoy high de jure independence, dissent frequently, and are integrated in the normal judicial hierarchy, the Estonian Supreme Court is a crucial case for the presumption that judicial disagreement reveals policy preferences. I analyse dissenting opinions using an ideal point response model. Examining the characteristics of cases which discriminated with respect to the recovered dimension, I show that this dimension cannot be interpreted as a meaningful policy dimension, but instead reflects disagreement about the proper scope of constitutional redress.

Key Words

Political ; Judicial Disagreement ; Estonian Supreme Court ; Non - Unanimous Decisions ; Normal Judicial Hierarchy ; Meaningful Policy Dimension

Links

'Full Text'

In Basket

Export

ID: 181561

Members of Parliament are Minimally Accountable for Their Issue Stances (and They Know It) / Hanretty, Chris; English, Patrick ; Mellon, Jonathan

Hanretty, Chris	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

For incumbents to be accountable for their issue stances, voters must sanction incumbents whose positions are “out of step” with their own. We test the electoral accountability of British legislators for their stance on Brexit. We find that there is very limited issue accountability. Individuals who disagreed with their representative’s stance on Brexit were 3 percentage points less likely to vote for them. The aggregate consequences of these individual effects are limited. A one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of constituents agreeing with their incumbent’s Brexit stance is associated with an increase of 0.53 percentage points in incumbent vote share. These effects are one and a half times larger when the main challenger has a different Brexit stance to the incumbent. A follow-up survey of Members of Parliament (MPs) shows that MPs’ estimates of the effects of congruence are similar in magnitude. Our findings suggest that issue accountability is conditional in nature and limited in magnitude even for an issue such as Brexit, which should be maximally amenable to such effects.

Key Words

Members of Parliament ; Minimally Accountable

In Basket

Export