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ID:
132793
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
General Boris Gromov, commander of the 40th Army of the Soviet Union, crossed the 'Friendship' bridge linking the Salang Pass on 15 February I989. hack to the motherland. Najibullah. the Afghan president and a Communist protege' of the USSR regime of Mikhail Gorbachev, was ousted from power in April 1992. The intervening three years have a story to tell to the various protagonists of the current Afghan drama being enacted right now as another superpower gets ready to decamp without completing what it set out to do. The Red Army had left in early I989, and its nominee, Najihullah. held on to power for another three years on the strength of the same Afghan army that had desertions, remained fragmented in factional lines - the Parchams and the Khalqis - and was depleted in terms of resources.
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| 2 |
ID:
123385
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Afghanistan has turned into one of India's most complex foreign policy challenges -with conflicting regional and extra regional players upping their stakes in the country. With barely a year left for the international community's retreat from Afghanistan, there is serious concern over the shaping up of economic, social, cultural and political trajectories therein. Finding common ground with the Taliban has become increasingly elusive and neither the Afghan army nor the political clan is showing any convincing signs of the capacity to assume responsibility for security and integrity of the country.
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| 3 |
ID:
183264
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rapid fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban almost immediately led US policymakers to cast blame on the intelligence community for a failure to warn of the Afghan Army’s imminent collapse. Yet an examination of historical case studies from Vietnam and Iraq, and emerging evidence regarding Afghanistan, suggests that the real failure lies in the intelligence–policy relationship. In these three cases spanning 60 years, US policymakers consistently lacked receptivity to objective intelligence assessments that were critical of military missions to train and equip foreign armies facing insurgencies. Rethinking the intelligence–policy relationship to rely more heavily on working-level officials’ perspectives, demonstrate openness to bad news and integrate alternative intelligence analysis into the policymaking process would increase the likelihood that viable military policies will succeed in the future, as well as the likelihood that futile policies will be abandoned.
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| 4 |
ID:
152015
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.
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| 5 |
ID:
135089
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| Edition |
2nd rev.ed.
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Asian educational services, 2001.
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| Description |
2vol.set; 350p., 358p.Hbk
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| Contents |
Vol I and Vol II, Old Publication
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| Standard Number |
812061589X
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057981 | 915.4/CON 057981 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 057982 | 915.4/CON 057982 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
125094
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, the United States has damaged its reputation and national security by lurching from one war to the next. Afghanistan, which began triumphantly for the Bush administration, has devolved into a protracted and inconclusive war in which the Taliban is making fresh inroads as American and allied forces hand over security to the Afghan army. Then there is Iraq. It was purveyed by the Bush administration to the American public as a mission that could be accomplished swiftly and smoothly. Neither occurred. Since then, President Obama's self-styled humanitarian intervention in Libya has led to instability, allowing local militias, among other things, to pretty much bring the oil industry to a standstill by disrupting major export terminals.
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| 7 |
ID:
125107
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE JOINT American and NATO campaign in Afghanistan which has been going on for over a decade now became the Alliance's largest and most expensive operation.
It has already sucked in over $ 1 trillion, claimed over 3 thousand lives (over half of them American) and left over 100 thousand wounded. As the hardest psychological test for NATO it triggered talks about its systemic crisis.
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| 8 |
ID:
113610
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