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| 1 |
ID:
113682
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Social policy is an indispensable element of rule and China's current leadership has moved policy to a more inclusive system based on a notion of citizenship. The extension of social welfare provision is examined through a case study of education and health care in the South China village of Yantian. Yantian lies at the core of the Pearl River Delta, which has become a key link in the global reorganization of manufacturing and production. Consequently the village is home to some 80 000 migrant workers who complement the 3000 registered inhabitants. A study of education and health-care provision reveals that in terms of equity, registered villagers enjoy significant advantages in seeking welfare resources. Although living in the same village, the two groups inhabit "different worlds." However, provision, while selective, has become more inclusive. The present research suggests that "social citizenship" will precede "political citizenship."
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| 2 |
ID:
186942
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| Summary/Abstract |
The household registration (hukou) system has been widely recognized as a key contributory factor to social inequality and tensions in China yet it remains intact despite a series of institutional reforms. What explains the resilience of the system? In this study, we address this puzzle by drawing on policy documents, statistical data and interviews. We argue that the hukou system remains because it is used to protect the beneficiaries of welfare provision and to ensure pivotal groups continue to offer political support. We find that owing to the reforms, a formidable barrier has been erected between the guarded cities and other regions to protect healthcare and education resources from inbound migrant workers. Consequently, the institutional reforms of the hukou system serve as a political contrivance for the survival of the Chinese party-state regime. The findings contribute to emerging literature on China's political control by elaborating political elites’ subtle tactics through various institutions at central and local levels. We expect the new “Great Wall” established under Xi's administration to be an even stronger barrier than before for migrants during the current pandemic and in the future.
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| 3 |
ID:
181251
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| 4 |
ID:
145744
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| Summary/Abstract |
The shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010.
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