|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
113790
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After the 1998 tests, both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, weapon usable material and significant civilian and military nuclear infrastructure. Both are seriously engaged in revising their plans and refining their weapons and delivery systems. They are spending enormous sums on the production, deployment, targeting, defence, supervision and control of their nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as well as on the infrastructure that would generate the fissile material, warheads, aircraft, missiles and command and control systems necessary for their nuclear programmes. But they observe utmost secrecy in all these matters. Hence, it is very difficult to comparatively assess their nuclear programmes. Much of the available literature is speculative and unreliable, and requires careful examination. The article compares the two nuclear programmes in terms of their respective nuclearisation routes, motivations, weapons capabilities, inventories, nuclear doctrines, command and control and delivery systems.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
167798
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Drone swarms—multiple unmanned systems capable of coordinating their actions to accomplish shared objectives—have major implications for the future of warfare. One important set of implications relates to the ability of drone swarms to complement, challenge, and even substitute for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. For example, swarming drones might enable more effective CBRN delivery. Or they might facilitate standoff detection, search the oceans for nuclear-armed submarines, or otherwise impede an adversary’s ability to threaten or employ CBRN weapons. Conventionally armed drone swarms might serve as strategic deterrents in lieu of CBRN weapons. At the same time, many CBRN-relevant applications of drone-swarm technology entail significant technical challenges even for very sophisticated states, and even more so for non-state actors whose capabilities will be far more limited, so there is considerable uncertainty around whether, how much, and when drone-swarm technology will complement, challenge, or substitute for CBRN weapons.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
161524
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
A reliable capability is essential for deterrence to succeed. While incredible threats coupled with an assured ability to hurt an adversary may be enough to alter behavior, even the most credible threat is left impotent in the absence of a sufficient capability. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union at times sought weapons with first-strike potential that threatened the effectiveness of each other’s deterrent. Since then, though, nuclear powers have either committed to a no first use policy or generally refrained from pursuing technologies that could radically upset the strategic balance. Recent trends, however, again pose a threat to this stability. Nascent “left-of-launch” missile defense programs which rely on offensive cyber operations or electronic warfare to target adversary weapon systems prior to launch offer new opportunities for sophisticated state actors to subvert the reliability of these capabilities. This paper assesses what risks there may be to nuclear weapon delivery systems before examining why a country might be motivated to carry out such an act, what the ramifications for deterrence stability might be, and how these threats could be mitigated.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|