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| 1 |
ID:
140944
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| Summary/Abstract |
While the Second World War is by far the most studied global conflict, prolific scholarship on its contours and causes has yet to yield consensus. The effectiveness of different military strategies, most notably air bombing, is still disputed. Richard Overy examines the claim that strategic bombing was a major factor in bringing both the European and Pacific wars to an end in 1945. Rejecting the argument that bombing led to surrender in either Germany or Japan, he highlights the significance of outright military defeat and political calculation.
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| 2 |
ID:
191921
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses how a creative writing workshop in 2017 Cairo dynamically engaged with cultural memories of the 1967 defeat of the Arab armies. The article first situates 1967 as a crucial reference point in discursive attempts to tie personal life stories to national history and in making sense of a widespread feeling of postcolonial disenchantment. It is in the ruinous aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, when a view on a political horizon beyond the stifling present temporarily was reopened, that the workshop critically examined the relations between cultural memory, family history, and everyday life with, at its center, the notion of defeat in all its shapes and intensities. The article argues that the workshop can be seen as βan intimate public,β carving out a space for survival lying largely outside of the sphere of politics. Nevertheless, in its affective plurality that stimulated modes of irreverence, the workshop tentatively opened up new political dispositions under the strenuous conditions of post-2013 Egypt.
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| 3 |
ID:
156126
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This paper outlines trends in devising practical recommendations on implementing planned methods of comprehensive damage to adversary information-driven systems when carrying out operational assignments to disorganize control over its troops and weapons in operations (combat actions).
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| 4 |
ID:
113864
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following costly military defeats political elites usually attempt to persuade their publics that the battlefield outcome was not a shameful defeat but a 'moral victory'. Yet, only sometimes their public accepts these claims. The paper tries to explain this variation in the domestic publics' perceptions in the cases of non-democratic entities. It is argued that the key variable that determines actors' success in claiming a moral victory is the existence of certain battlefield elements, or at least symbolic military acts/achievements of the defeated actor which can persuade his public that these battlefield elements existed. Propaganda efforts to misrepresent the battlefield facts can play only a secondary role and only under certain conditions.
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